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South Korea’s democratization process appears to have begun in 1986, when President 
Chun responded to massive civilian protest and announced a direct and free election. But 
Korea’s1 road to democracy was much longer than meets the eye. Dated from the moment of 
Korea’s independence after the Japanese surrender, it took more than 40 years to arrive at those 
transition elections, and sustain a true, liberal democratization process.  
This thesis asks: What delayed South Korea’s democracy? To answer this question, I 
argue that South Korea’s democratization has been delayed due to the lack of legal justice, truth 
finding and reconciliation processes at certain moments of South Korea’s modern history. 
Specifically, the thesis employs the methodology of process tracing and path dependency 
analysis, and identifies two critical junctures when impunity was allowed to stand, “veto players” 
–both internal and external— asserted their power, and democratization was held back. These 
critical junctures are 1) the post-World War II period, when the newly established South Korean 
government failed to prosecute pro-Japanese collaborators, and 2) the 1980’s, when dictator Park 
was assassinated and the interim government failed to hold the Park administration accountable 
for its wrong doings. A main theme that is pervasive throughout the thesis is that the U.S. 
policies played a major role in affecting Korea’s delayed democratization. Indeed it is the 
interaction of internal and external factors that accounts for the reinforcement of the impunity 
path over time. I then conclude by discussing the current state of Korea’s democracy, specifically 
evaluating the impact of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, established in 2005, and its 
attempt to bring some means of justice after sixty years of impunity.   
  
                                                 




In South Korea, there is a cultural literary concept called “Han.” It expresses a collective 
sentiment of deep pain and oppression, and for many Koreans, it expresses how Korean people 
are survivors of unending injustice and persecution. Korea, a country with a long history of 5,000 
years, has been invaded by the Chinese, the Mongols, and the Japanese. During the Cold War, 
Korea was dominated by the super powers’ competition for spheres of influence, leading to a 
divided nation. These tumultuous events affected everyday Koreans to experience oppression 
and share a fragmented history. Even after the war, Korea was never truly free. Its political 
sphere was filled with more than 30 years of repressive authoritarian regimes, marked by 
numerous cases of human rights violations. Today, despite the country’s much-praised 
democratic transition, Korea is a nation of unresolved past injustices.  
The hotly contested 2012 election of Park Geun-Hye as the sixth democratic president of 
South Korea was actually emblematic of its dark, unresolved past. As the daughter of the 
infamous dictator Park Chung-Hee, who led the nation with an iron fist from 1963 to 1979, Park 
and her road to the presidency posed a great deal of controversy. Although her father was famous 
for bringing in rapid industrialization and modernization in the aftermath of the Korean War, he 
also maintained a regime marked by numerous forced disappearances, mass killings, and 
indefinite imprisonment of innocent victims. During the campaign, lingering memories of the 
heydays of economic growth clashed against those of brutality and heinous crimes that her father 
and his regime had committed. Park’s election to the presidency recalled painful memories of 
iron fists that gripped the nation for nearly 30 years. And yet as a daughter of the infamous 
dictator and the nation’s first woman president, it seemed to underscore the consolidation of 
South Korea’s democracy based on reconciliation and modernity.  
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However, I will argue, these appearances are deceptive. Rather, even after 60 years of 
nation building and institutional change, Korea’s democracy is still incomplete because it failed 
to reckon with unresolved past injustices. Even though Korea has elected an eleventh president 
and a woman at that, and maintains forms of democracy, there are still remains of lingering 
impunity questions at the core of the society. A nation’s democracy cannot be fully consolidated 
unless its past problems and abuses are amended. As a result, South Korea’s democracy has been 
delayed and it is still not fully consolidated.  
For some students and scholars who study transitions to democracy, Korea’s unresolved 
past injustice presents an interesting puzzle: Why did Korea’s democracy come about during the 
late 1980s and not during the early 1950s or the early 1980s? Especially in 1945, during its post-
colonialism period, there was a robust consensus favoring the prosecution of its human rights 
abusers and collaborators of the Japanese regime. However, as this thesis will demonstrate, this 
was soon stopped due to pressure by what game theorists refer to as veto-players. Then again, 
after President Park’s assassination in 1979, the window of opportunity opened once more, but it 
soon closed again due to the lack of strong leadership and other forces that went against 
prosecution of wrongdoers from the Park regime. Time and time again, there were numerous 
windows of opportunity in Korea’s history to both initiate rule of law to establish free and fair 
elections and correct past injustices, but these windows closed up with repressive and unfair 
endings. Thus, impunity is a vicious cycle that has plagued Korea’s modern history for a half 
century with forced amnesia of the past. 
In this thesis, I will argue that the delay was caused by the path dependent effects and 
constraints of decisions to institutionalize impunity. I will demonstrate this by examining two 
moments in history to see whether or not Time 1, the moment of independence from Japan in 
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1945, set Korea on a limited path to Time 2, the moment after President Park’s assassination, 
with limited choices. Did the lack of democratic institutions and accounting systems of 
wrongdoers during Time 1 contribute to Time 2? Were there new mechanisms and vehicles 
available during Time 2 that Korea was ultimately unable to utilize? Lastly, how were they 
similar and different? I hypothesize that by establishing a rule of law to maintain fair and free 
election and correct past injustices, these moments could have turned out differently and Korea’s 
democracy may have been fully consolidated sooner. 
 
I. Brief History of Correcting Past Injustice and Democratization 
In the twentieth century, there were two watershed moments in countries that faced 
colonialism and the Cold War era, including South Korea, to build transitional justice and 
democracy: the post-World War II period and post-Cold War period. Specifically, during the 
post-World War II period, countries in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East that had suffered from 
colonial repression longed to create their own independent democratic states and resolve with 
their past.  Immediately preceding this wave of  independence, the Nuremberg Trials and Tokyo 
Trials were set up to prosecute any political, military, and economic leadership who were 
responsible for committing heinous crimes, namely massive killings and use of violent 
repression against civilians. The trials underscored the need for accounting for past regimes in 
order for these persecuting countries to be readmitted into the community of nations, which is 
known today as the United Nations. Eventually, the precedents set from the military tribunals 
became an example to rectify past wrongdoings and bring reparation to victims.  
However, severe political unrest, social conflict, revolutionary violence, and the clash of 
ideologies filled the political vacuum of the post-World War II era. Decolonized nations 
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continued to carry the burden of the colonial past and state elites consolidated their power in 
political, economic, and social arenas. Decolonization did not lead to democratization. Soon, the 
era of the Cold War began and the United States’ Cold War priorities determined U.S. foreign 
policy to focus on the promotion of anti-communist governments, often at the expense of its 
democratic credentials. In the majority of cases, the work of overcoming colonial legacies and 
crafting a new democratic nation remained unfulfilled and left to be tackled by the formerly 
colonized states later.  
The second period came with the collapse of authoritarianism, military dictatorships, and 
the Cold War, mostly in the 1980s. At this moment, the nations that had just escaped from 
military dictatorships and totalitarianism were met with political turmoil and unrest in the 
transitional period for democracy. Similar to those postcolonial nations that faced past 
wrongdoings by their colonial rulers and collaborators, countries that maintained dictatorship 
during the Cold War period were also met with a task of dealing with past-wrongdoings of 
authoritarian rulers and collaborators. Governmental and non-governmental institutions were 
founded in countries— such as the National Commission for Forced Disappearances of 
Argentina and South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission — to deal with past 
atrocities by seeking truth and reconciliation or by prosecuting the perpetrators.2 
Specifically in South Korea’s case, the first turning point for transitional justice was 
during the postcolonial period, 1945 to 1950. After Japanese colonialism ended in Korea, the 
main political task was to establish an independent democratic nation-state. The U.S. military 
government prosecuted Japanese war criminals through the Tokyo War Crimes Trial, but it failed 
                                                 
2 For Argentina, further information can be found in Ernesto Sabato, "Report of CONADEP: National Commission 
on the Disappearance of Persons." El Proyecto Desaparecidos. 1984. Accessed March 26, 2014. 
http://www.desaparecidos.org/nuncamas/web/english/library/nevagain/nevagain_001.htm. For South Africa, see 




to adopt a similar policy in South Korea because the United States saw Koreans as victims of 
Japanese annexation, not as enemies of the United States. It was apparent that in order to build a 
new nation where justice and democracy flourished, getting rid of Japan’s colonial governance 
and prosecuting local collaborators were the priorities. However, U.S. occupational forces 
arrested and convicted only a few Koreans who served in the Japanese Army, while those 
serving in Japan’s colonial regime were never regarded as criminals and were never punished.  
At the same time, demands by the public for the prosecution of Japanese collaborators 
were not easily dismissed. To appease public sentiment, the Korean National Assembly passed 
the Special Act on Punishing Anti-National Conducts, which created a commission to investigate 
and prosecute Japanese collaborators, in November 1948.3 However, the investigation to correct 
historical justice was short-lived. The conservatives often hindered the investigation, and 
President Rhee even accused the commission as communists and protested that the Act might be 
misused to arrest innocent citizens. The commission ceased to function and it came to an end 
within a year without producing promising results. Korea’s transition to democracy came to a 
halt as General Park Chung-Hee took over the regime through a military coup in 1961. Park 
ruled South Korea for more than 18 years with violent repression aimed at its own citizens and 
power concentrated in the executive branch.  
The second turning point came in 1979 when President Park was assassinated by the head 
of Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA). The new interim president, Choi Kyu-Ha, and 
his cabinet members firmly believed that the time for democratic transition was ripe. They held 
press conferences to inform the public about planning a free and fair election and beginning 
constitutional reform. 4  The Choi administration even regularly contacted U.S. officials for 
                                                 
3 Dong-Choon Kim, "The Long Road Toward Truth And Reconciliation," Critical Asian Studies 42.4 (2010): 526. 
4 Dong-A Ilbo, December 21, 1979. 
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technical advice on political liberalization. However, in a matter of three months after Park’s 
assassination, General Chun Doo-Hwan took over the regime by military coup and controlled 
interim president Choi Kyu-Ha’s influence.  
People’s rage finally exploded at the May 1980 protest against Chun’s dictatorship in 
Gwangju. It was a popular uprising by Gwangju residents, mainly students, that ended with 
2,000 casualties. 5 Protestors took control over the city and took up arms by raiding police 
stations, but they were crushed by the Korean Army. As a result, thousands of cases of torture 
and forced disappearances were formed. Then, in 1986, met by the popular demand to oust Chun, 
his party, the Democratic Justice Party, announced direct elections. 
At this point, South Korea formed a pacted democracy, which is a democracy held 
together by an agreement among elite groups of the country to bring about democratic transition 
without confronting impunity.6 The reform group within the South Korean government made an 
agreement, and opposition groups accepted it in order to avoid mutual catastrophe. Previously, 
opposition parties existed under the Chun regime, but they were merely set up as puppet 
organizations that maintained little real legislative power. But with the opening for a democratic 
transition, Chun allowed political activities of the opposition parties. Both the reform group, the 
New Democratic Republican Group, and the moderate opposition group within the government 
and Chun’s ruling party, Democratic Justice Party, felt that a total collapse of government would 
not serve their best interests nor those of the country. They agreed to a proposal for the 
development of a democratic procedure. Accordingly, South Korea’s democratic transition 
                                                 
5 Kim, op. cit.,  536. 
6 Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions 




through negotiations and pacts among political elites made it possible to sustain political, social, 
and economic structures.  
With the strong support of Chun and the vote-splitting of opposition parties between Kim 
Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung, Rho Tae-Woo won the 1986 presidential election and took over 
the regime. In 1989, giving into the demands of the public to recognize the victims of the protest 
movement, Rho passed the Law for Compensating the Victims of the Gwangju Incident, which 
compensated the victims without the pursuit of truth and criminal justice. However, although 
Roh was elected through a direct public vote, his legitimacy suffered because of his past as a 
military general. Also, after beginning the process of democratic transition, the demands of civil 
society were not satisfied. The continuously unstable socioeconomic situation derived from 
student and labor demonstrations made it difficult for a new democracy to maintain its 
efficiency.7 
When President Kim Young-Sam was elected and inaugurated in 1993, he yielded to 
public pressure and agreed to sign the Gwangju Special Law. With this, in 1995, Chun was tried 
by Seoul District Court and found guilty of staging a military coup in 1979 and ordering a 
military crackdown in 1980 that led to the killing of hundreds of anti-government protesters in 
Gwangju. Roh Tae-Woo was charged with his role in seizing power and taking bribes from a 
number of large conglomerate corporations. Chun was given a death sentence, and Roh a 22 ½ 
year imprisonment. However, just one year after their convictions, the court reduced their 
sentences: Chun’s death sentence to life imprisonment and Roh’s sentence to be reduced to 17 
years of imprisonment. In 1997, the then-president Kim Young-Sam and his successor Kim Dae-
Jung agreed to release and give special pardons to Chun and Roh, who were serving their time in 
                                                 
7 Sangmook Lee, "Democratic Transition and the Consolidation of Democracy in South Korea," Taiwan Journal of 
Democracy 3rd ser. 3.99-125 (2007): 111. 
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prison.8 In a nationally televised statement, Kim reminded the nation that the special pardon was 
carried out “to unite the country’s leadership and reconcile the past to build a new era for this 
country.”9 However, the announcement was met by conflicting responses from Korean nationals, 
especially from the Cholla region where Chun ordered a bloody military retaliation that led to 
hundreds of casualties. While it is laudable that the Korean Court brought forth a trial to hold 
state officials accountable for serious crimes such as mutiny, treason, and bribery, the delayed 
prosecution failed to achieve any of its supposed goals of justice. The defendants failed to pay 
the full consequences of their wrongdoings, while victims felt that the recognition of their 
damages and sufferings was not fully materialized. When a leap towards justice was made, it was 
then too late with too little punishment and accounting.   
Coming out of this, it is evident that the two watershed moments in South Korea’s 
political history lacked truth and reconciliation processes during the mid-1940 to 1980’s. It failed 
to head off governmental officials with past war crimes and abuse of human rights and led them 
to operate in succeeding regimes, carrying out same abusive tactics as they did in the past and 
leading Korea to an illiberal democracy.10 This institutionalization of impunity made up the rot 
at the heart of South Korea’s democracy. This impunity problem exacerbated the political and 
social culture drastically and thus, delayed the consolidation of Korea’s democracy.  
A significant force delayed Korea’s democratization by turning a blind eye to prosecuting 
war criminals and perpetrators of human rights, and to recognizing victims. There were 
individuals and institutions, some who had committed crimes, and others who protected 
                                                 
8 David Holley, "Jailed S. Korea Ex-Presidents to Get Pardons," Los Angeles Times, December 20, 1997. Accessed 
December 21, 2013. http://articles.latimes.com/1997/dec/20/news/mn-508. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Illiberal democracy is a term coined by Fareed Zakaria. It is a governing system in which free and fair elections  
are held but citizens lack civil liberties and the government fails to represent interest of its own citizens. Fareed 
Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," Foreign Affairs 76.6 (1997): 22. Print. 
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wrongdoers from prosecution to enhance their own power. These powers11 benefitted from the 
sordid culture of corruption and its damaging impact on the society. This culture broke down the 
rule of law and legitimacy of democratic ideals.  Effectively, impunity comes about when there 
is a vibrant interaction between veto-players and reformers, and when the veto players prevail, 
impunity slows down institutional movement to political liberalization. Thus, this thesis locates 
Korea in the spectrum of democratization process and identifies veto-players, who were key 
actors that kept Korea on the “impunity” path.  
 
II. Research Procedure 
The main puzzle that this thesis focuses on is: Why did it take so long for South Korea to 
build itself as a democratic nation?  My answer comes in three parts:  first, identifying the 
processes that delayed democratization – particularly, the institutionalization of impunity – and 
second, identifying the forces that explain how and why impunity got institutionalized – which 
were both internal and external. Finally, I demonstrate the causal connection between impunity 
and delayed democratization.   
I have made use of a variety of conceptual tools to construct this answer. 12 In the next 
section of this chapter, I will develop three interrelated concepts:  path dependency, process 
tracing, and critical junctures; in the following section I add the concept of veto players (both 
internal and external) to explain the mechanisms by which impunity becomes institutionalized.  
                                                 
11 In this thesis, they are identified as veto-players. 
12 Applying a variety of theoretical frameworks to illustrate a case has proven to be a productive approach in this 
thesis. It has allowed me to identify limits to making generalizations about veto-players who benefitted from 
impunity, while helping me to understand that there were other key variables in achieving a full, legitimate 
democracy. "Theoretical Framework," USC Libraries. University of Southern California, n.d. Web. Accessed 
December 19, 2013. http://libguides.usc.edu/content.php?pid=83009. 
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In the final section, I examine the concepts of impunity and transitional justice, and make the 
connection to delayed democratization.   
 
Process Tracing and Critical Junctures 
I first began the research by using a method of constructing detailed chronologies of 
trajectories. Then utilizing “process tracing,” I plotted events chronologically with detailed 
summaries to see how a certain outcome came about due to the convergence of several 
conditions, causal chains, and independent variables.13 Then I looked at how certain “putative 
causes” can be linked to “observed effects” in a given time frame. That is to say “of the two 
kinds of evidence on the theoretical causal notions of causal effect and causal mechanisms, tests 
of covariation attempt to address the former, and process tracing assesses the latter.”14  
As a result of this process tracing method, I identified two moments— the late 1940s and 
the late 1970s/early 1980s— as critical junctures when Korea might have had the opportunity to 
go off the path of impunity, but ultimately was unable to take that new path. First, especially 
during the postcolonial period from 1945 to 1950, the window of opportunity to bring pro-
Japanese collaborators to justice and reconcile the past had opened up. President Rhee even 
passed the Special Act on Punishing Anti-National Conducts that set up a commission to 
investigate and punish the collaborators. 15  However, the chance to bring justice and 
reconciliation soon came to a halt when the commission was terminated without solid results due 
to the attacks from the conservatives. Then again in 1979, when President Park was assassinated 
                                                 
13 Alexander L. George, and Andrew Bennett. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005: 1. 
14 Andrew Bennett and Alexander George, “Process Tracing in Case Study Research,” paper presented at the 
MacArthur Foundation Workshop on Case Study Methods, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs 
(BCSIA), Harvard University, October 17-19, 1997. Accessed December 20, 2013. 
http://users.polisci.wisc.edu/kritzer/teaching/ps816/ProcessTracing.htm. Emphasis mine. 
15 Kim, op. cit., 530. 
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and Koreans were hoping for an institutional regime change to a liberal government after 
decades of repressive iron fist, the window had opened up again this time for the “Seoul 
Spring.”16 However, the acting president Choi Kyu-Ha, who quickly worked to bring a smooth 
transition to democracy, failed in his pursuit when General Chun initiated a military coup and 
took over, forcing President Choi to resign from his post. Again, the opportunity to punish 
violators of human rights from the previous regime had been missed and the path to dictatorship 
gripped itself again in Korea.  
 These two key moments became critical junctures, which led me to closely examine the 
openings of these times. According to Lipset and Rokkan, a critical juncture is a “watershed 
moment in which different transitions lead to certain directions of change and foreclose others in 
a way that shapes politics for years to come.”17 It is also a central element of path dependency 
analysis, which has become a key tool in comparative politics to make sense of the impact of the 
past on political processes and institutions. Critical junctures have three components: the claim 
that a significant change has occurred, the claim that this change took place in distinct ways in 
different cases, and the explanatory hypothesis about its consequences.18 In order to identify a 
critical juncture, political scientists look at how antecedent conditions with contingent choices 
lead to setting up specific trajectory of institutional development and consolidation that is 
difficult to reverse. I looked at how these critical times contributed to “path dependency”— 
reflecting how the decisions made during this time limited the trajectory of the future. Studying 
these two defining moments offered this thesis the spectrum of choices and decisions made by 
the state and powerful social actors that shaped South Korea’s road to democracy. 
                                                 
16 Korean democracy scholars refer to this brief moment of democratization as the “Seoul Spring.” For more on this 
moment, see the case study in Chapter 3, below. 
17 Ruth Collier, and David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and 
Regime Dynamics in Latin America, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991: 27. 
18  Ibid., p. 30. 
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Veto-Players and the Impunity Path 
In this section, I am going to discuss veto-players and the impunity path, which is the 
second part of my three-part argument. As put forward by leading game theorist George Tsebelis, 
veto-players are individual or collective actors whose agreement is necessary for a change of the 
status quo. Such a change in status quo requires a unanimous decision of all veto-players.19  In 
this thesis, the status quo is the institution of impunity, and a change in the status quo would be  
institutional change to democratization through vehicles such as bringing justice and reconciling 
the past.  Veto-players are the individuals or groups of people who firmly maintained control 
of— or more precisely, hindered the impact of— the aforementioned vehicles. Veto-players are 
crucial to this thesis because their activities can determine a country’s path dependency. Since 
institutions are hard to change and slow to self-examination, a veto-player’s choice of action can 
either limit or adamantly close openings for rectification. Thus, I hypothesize that impunity at 
Time 1 makes it more difficult to face it at Time 2.  
 Veto-players could be anyone or any group from the presidents to the military that 
extended a certain degree of impunity to maintain their hold of power and legitimacy. In this 
thesis, it will be politicians, the military and external powers. While the United States had played 
a major role in shaping Korean politics through pressure and coercion, there are other veto-
players within Korean society that defended their own privileges and power. In order to closely 
examine the relationships and the dynamic of the veto-players, I am going to delve into 
telegrams among U.S. officials, newspaper articles during the time, and declassified archives of 
internal memos within the government. Also, it is crucial to investigate veto-players and 
impunity by asking following questions about each era: 
 
                                                 
19 George Tsebelis, Veto Players How Political Institutions Work, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011: 9. 
Yang 16 
 
1) Who were the veto-players? 
2) When and how was impunity created? 
3) What was veto-players’ modus operandi?  
4) Who benefitted? 
5) What kind of defense was maintained to privilege others? 
6) What was the cost and implication of their actions? 
 
Impunity as the Rot that Decays Democracy and Delays Democratization 
a) What is Impunity and Why Does it Matter? 
In the process of preserving their veto-power, some of the players institutionalized impunity 
and became a rot to the Korean society that hindered the process of democratization. After 
specifically identifying the veto-players, the thesis investigates veto-players’ impunity and its 
functions, finding out whether or not it worsened and/or expanded to other areas. But before 
doing this, I need to establish conceptually, legally, and politically why impunity matters. 
According to the Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights 
Through Action to Combat Impunity, submitted to the United Nations Commission of Human 
Rights: 
Impunity is the impossibility of bringing the perpetrators of violations to account – 
whether in criminal, civil, administrative or disciplinary proceedings. Impunity arises 
from a failure by States to meet their obligations to investigate violations; to take 
appropriate measures in respect of the perpetrators, particularly in the area of justice, by 
ensuring that those suspected of criminal responsibility are prosecuted, tried and duly 
punished; to provide victims with effective remedies and to ensure that they receive 
reparation for the injuries suffered; to ensure the inalienable right to know the truth about 
violations; and to take other necessary steps to prevent a recurrence of violations.20 
 
                                                 
20 "Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to Combat 




Likewise, impunity causes a broader societal rot that damages the core of democracy. Fighting 
against impunity is a significant battle in fixing a culture of violence, corruption, and oppression. 
As Woody writes, “failure to control the trend of impunity can have grave consequences for a 
newly developed government and can pose myriad setbacks and limitations to future evolution of 
the state.”21 Specifically, when there is a continuity of impunity in government, citizens are 
prone to lose faith in the new state and believe that the “old ways” will continue to prevail in the 
new state. I argue that past regime officials must be held accountable to the point where no 
impunity is possible and “rule of law becomes the only game in town” even during political and 
economic crisis.22 The institution of impunity must be directly faced and resolved as a nation 
transitions into a consolidated democracy. This idea is known as “transitional justice,” which 
refers to the “set of judicial and non-judicial measures that have been implemented by different 
countries in order to redress the legacies of massive human rights abuses. These measures 
include criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, reparations programs, and various kinds of 
institutional reforms.”23 
 
b) Transitional Justice:  No Transition without (Legal) Justice?  
Over the years, transitional justice has taken shape in multifaceted forms. The basic 
question of how to reckon with massive past crimes and abuses raises a range of approaches as a 
new regime emerges in pursuit of peace and democracy.24 There are numerous mechanisms and 
instruments to deal with the past: holding trials; purging perpetrators from public or security 
                                                 
21 Katherine Woody, Truth and Justice: The Role of Truth Commissions in Post-Conflict Societies, Working paper, 
Report prepared for Law of Nationbuilding Seminar. Chicago: IIT Chicago - Kent College of Law, 2009. Print. 
22 Juan Linz and Alfred C. Stepan, "Toward Consolidated Democracies," Journal of Democracy 7.2 (1996): 14. 
23 "International Center for Transitional Justice." ICTJ. International Center for Transitional Justice. Accessed 
February 27, 2014. http://ictj.org/about/transitional-justice 
24 San Wook Daniel Han, "Transitional Justice: When Justice Strikes Back - Case Studies of Delayed Justice in 
Argentina and South Korea," Houston Journal of International Law 30.3 (2008): 6. 
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posts; creating commission of inquiry; providing individualized access to security files; 
providing reparation to victims; building memorials; implementing military, police, judicial, or 
reforms.25 In this thesis, I am going to focus on criminal justice, i.e., the need for bringing 
justice in the courts by prosecuting former human rights abusers.  
One of the main debates in transitional justice has been about whether or not a new 
regime should punish human rights abusers from the past regime after a recent transition to a 
new democratic regime. 26  Bringing justice in the courts is among the most difficult and 
prominent demands. Critics argue that bringing justice may exacerbate the new regime’s political 
instability, and thus may lead to possible military coup by the opposition. However, without 
clear and flexible prosecutions after a transition, a new emerging regime will suffer from the rot 
caused by those who operate above the law and maintain firm hold of decision-making in the 
political arena. Holding those human rights abusers accountable promotes the new regime’s rule 
of law and creates legitimacy of its governance. It should be one of the first priorities for a 
regime that pursues peace and democracy. While it is said that “justice delayed is justice denied,” 
it is better late than never. Justice often comes slowly and it is an on-going process that needs to 
be continued for a period of time. Still, bringing justice soon after transition sheds light on harsh 
devastations that defendants had faced and allows the public to be informed about the nature of 
the state.  
                                                 
25 Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions, New 
York, NY: Routledge, 2011: 8. 
26 Priscilla B. Hayner, "Fifteen Truth Commissions--1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study." Human Rights Quarterly 
16.4 (1994): 605. 
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In order to talk about different cases of transitional justice, it is imperative to talk about 
what transitional justice is as a mechanism. According to Jon Elster, there are three forms of 
justice under transitional justice: political justice, administrative justice, and legal justice.27  
Political justice occurs when the executive branch of the government unilaterally decides 
what should be done with wrongdoers. It takes the form of show trials, where in a highly public 
trial judicial officers have already determined the guilt of the defendant. Administrative justice is 
allowing officials who are purged to have the benefit of due process. Legal justice, the form that 
should be given the highest consideration, is characterized by four features. First, the laws should 
be as unambiguous as possible, to reduce the scope for judicial interpretation. Second, the 
judiciary should be insulated from the other branches of government. Third, judges and jurors 
should be unbiased when interpreting the law. They should not distort the meaning of the law to 
justify a decision they have already reached. Fourth, legal justice must adhere to the principles of 
due process: the right to choose one’s own lawyer, the right to appeal, respect for statute of 
limitations, determination of individual guilt, and a presumption of innocence that places the 
burden of proof on the prosecution.28 Each of these features is instrumental in eliminating the rot 
of impunity and in claiming back citizens’ faith in the rule of law and in democracy. Hence, this 
thesis advocates for legal justice in the course of any transitional justice.  
Applying the concept of legal justice, trials must be carried out in a way that adheres to 
both legitimacy (procedural fairness) and distributive justice (substantive fairness). For a system 
to be fair: 
  
                                                 
27 Jon Elster, Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004: 85. 




“… it must be firmly rooted in a framework of formal requirements about how rules are 
made, interpreted and applied. Among the marks of legitimacy are the determinacy of the 
legal rules, their symbolic validation through the possession of attributes that mark them 
out as authoritative, their application in a coherent manner that treat ‘like cases alike’ and 
their adherence to secondary rules that govern the creation, interpretation and application 
of such rules.”29 
 
 
It must move beyond the political realm, and ground the proceedings in objectively fair standards, 
which promotes due process and freedom from the fear of arbitrary punishment.30 In terms of 
punishment for defendants, retributive justice should be carried out in a way that punishment fits 
the crime and that like cases are treated alike. Wrongdoers deserve blame and punishment in 
direct proportion to the harm inflicted. However, overly harsh punishments do not make society 
any more secure and serve to increase the level of harm done. Punishment is thought to reinforce 
the rules of international law and to deny those who have violated those rules any unfair 
advantages. There is a need to give wrongdoers what they deserve, but in a way that avoids 
further escalation of the conflict— allowing formal institutions with trained judiciaries to carry 
out just retribution. The International Criminal Court (ICC) is one avenue of retributive justice to 
“transfer the responsibilities for apportioning blame and punishment from victims to public 
bodies acting according to the rule of law.”31  
 
 
                                                 
29 Thomas Franck, “Fairness in International Law and Institutions”, quoted in J. Tasiolas,, “International Law  
and the Limits of Fairness” European Journal of International Law 13 (2002): 993 
30 I would like to thank Professor Thomas Halper for bringing up this issue and suggesting that I delve further into 
the mechanism of the trial.  
31 Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass Violence, Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1998: 11. 
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c) “Delayed” Democratization:  Defining Transition and Consolidation, or, What Counts 
as ‘Democracy’? 
In each of the case studies in this thesis, a given era will be located on the spectrum of 
democracies. It will start with the political and socioeconomic context of that era and delve into 
what type of democracy the government was operating. Thus, it is crucial to clarify and 
crystallize theories on democracy and democratization. 
Democratization, at a minimum, involves holding free elections on a regular basis and 
determining who governs on the basis of the results. 32 It also involves bring an end to an 
undemocratic regime, the inception of a democratic regime, and then the consolidation of a 
democratic system. Many scholars contributing to this literature view the transition phase of 
democratization as a period of great uncertainty. This phase entails a new democratic set of rules 
for political life. The end of the period of democratic transition becomes successful when a new 
democracy establishes a new constitution and holds free elections for political leaders with few 
barriers to participation.33 After a successful democratic transition, the task of the consolidation 
of democracy becomes next in order. This linear process, democratic transition through election 
and towards consolidation of democracy, has been part of an on-going debate as to what 
constitutes a consolidated democracy. Thus, I argue that a nation’s democracy cannot be fully 
consolidated unless its past problems and abuses are amended.  
On the whole, there are two conceptions of democracy.34 One is a minimalist conception 
that emphasizes procedural or formal democracy. Procedural democracy is evident when a new 
                                                 
32  Sangmook Lee, "Democratic Transition and the Consolidation of Democracy in South Korea," Taiwan Journal of 
Democracy 3rd ser. 3.99-125 (2007): 102. 
33 Julio Samuel Valenzuela, Democratic Consolidation in Post-transitional Settings: Notion, Process, and 
Facilitating Conditions, Notre Dame: Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame, 
1990: 70. 
34 Lee, op. cit, : 103. 
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democratic regime elects political leaders through a free and fair election and maintains vibrant 
party competition, yet its citizens and the civil society fail to influence the policies of the country. 
Schmitter defines this minimalist conception as “the process of transforming the accidental 
arrangements, prudential norms, and contingent solutions that have emerged during the transition 
into relations of cooperation and competition that are reliably known, regularly practiced, and 
voluntarily accepted by those persons or collectives that participate in democratic governance.”35 
Linz and Stepan also mention that “none of the major political actors, parties, or organized 
interests, forces, or institutions considers that there is any alternative to the democratic process to 
gain power and that no political institutions or groups have a claim to veto the action of 
democratically elected decision makers… To put it simply, democracy must be seen as the only 
game in town.”36  
The other is a maximalist conception focusing on the outcomes of politics such as social 
justice, economic equality, or establishing political institutions. Scholars favoring the maximalist 
conception argue that both political and socioeconomic equality are needed for a country’s 
democracy to be consolidated. Such a democracy would include both procedural and substantive 
democracy elements such as “guarantees of civil rights, democratic accountability, civilian 
control over the military, democratic and constitutional checks on executive authority, and 
punishment of occupational and human rights abuses.”37  
Because of the influence of his work The Third Wave, I am going to use Samuel 
Huntington’s definitions of democracy as a litmus test to classify and identify a democratic 
regime. According to Huntington, the definition of democracy in relation to free and fair 
                                                 
35 Philippe C. Schmitter, "The Consolidation of Democracy and Representation of Social Groups," American 
Behavioral Scientist 35.4-5 (1992): 424. 
36 Juan Linz and Alfred C. Stepan, "Toward Consolidated Democracies," Journal of Democracy 7.2 (1996): 14. 
37 Hyug Baeg Im, The Prospects for Democratic Consolidation in South Korea: Facilitating and Obstructing 
Conditions, International Political Science Association. Working paper. p. 3. 
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elections is a minimal definition. A society could choose its political leaders but they do not 
exercise real power. True democracy, which aligns to the maximalist definition, means citizen 
control over policy, responsible government, honesty and openness in politics, informed and 
rational deliberation, equal participation, and promotion of civil and political rights.38 Political 
leaders share power with other groups in society. Lastly, nondemocratic regimes do not have 
electoral competition and widespread voting participation.39 
In order to investigate South Korea’s case of democracy and how it has been affected by 
veto-players, in this phase of the analysis I will examine the transparency level of Korean 
governmental institutions, distribution of power among the judicial, executive, and legislative 
branches, and the level of autonomy by presidency. I will also study scholarly analysis on 
political institutions including both governmental agencies and the office of Korea president, and 
reports by Truth and Reconciliation of South Korea.  
 
III. Contribution to the Literature on Democratization 
a) Confronting Impunity Is Beneficial, Not Threatening, to Democratization 
In this thesis I argue that the process of digging out the past and prosecuting 
wrongdoers— specifically those who benefitted from impunity and human rights violators— is a 
crucial step in transitional justice, and that this process fosters democratization. As I will 
examine in Chapter 1, scholarship on the need for prosecution has been polarizing over the years, 
but after the end of the Cold War, a new consensus has emerged favoring prosecution as a 
necessary part of transitional justice. 
                                                 
38 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1991: 9. 
39 Ibid., p. 12. 
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First-generation “transitologists,” writing in the 1970s and 1980s, stand against my 
aforementioned argument and generally conclude that prosecution of past violations is likely to 
destabilize new democracies. Huntington, a frontrunner of this general literature in academic and 
policy circles, believed that truth as well as justice were threats to new democracies, and 
prosecuting authoritarian officials for human rights violations would incur political costs that 
would outweigh any moral gains.40 His credibility not only carried a huge weight to the next 
generation of transitology scholars but also reinforced the scholars of previous generations. In 
their 1986 report Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain 
Democracies, leading transitologists Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter do 
acknowledge the need to investigate violations of human rights, but suggest that in most 
transitional countries, holding trials would be very difficult. They write, “[only] if civilian 
politicians use courage and skill, it may not necessarily be suicidal for a nascent democracy to 
confront the most reprehensible facts of its recent past.” 41  Also, as scholars were coming 
together with this shared belief in the 1980’s, even Aryeh Neier, executive director of Human 
Rights Watch at the time, was pessimistic regarding prosecution. It was a big blow to the human 
rights community because as an activist, Neier has led multiple investigations of human rights 
around the world. He wrote that “permitting the armed forces to make themselves immune to 
prosecution for dreadful crimes seems intolerable… yet it also seems irrational to insist that an 
elected civilian government should commit suicide by provoking its armed forces.”42 
                                                 
40 Ibid., p. 231. 
41 Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions 
about Uncertain Democracies, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1986: 32. 
42 Aryeh Neier, "What Should Be Done about the Guilty?" The New York Review of Books, February 1, 1990. 




 Even in more recent years, this shared belief is still maintained by many scholars. Many 
scholars of international relations and international law have been critical of the increasing use of 
international human rights prosecution. For example, Stephen Krasner, one of the leading voices 
in this critique, writes in a New York Times Op-Ed piece that “attempts to bring even the leader 
of an abhorrent regime to trial could make it more difficult to promote democracy by making 
such leaders and their accomplices more desperate to maintain their hold on power.” 43  In 
addition, Jack Snyder, another leading realist scholar, and his co-author Leslie Vinjamuri also 
argue that on the basis of thirty-two cases of transitioning countries, human rights trials can 
increase the likelihood of future atrocities, exacerbate conflict, and undermine efforts to build 
democracy.44  
 At the same time, there is a long counter-tradition favoring trials. Political theorist Judith 
Shklar writes, “trials may actually serve liberal ends, where they promote legalistic values in 
such a way as to contribute to constitutional politics and to a decent legal system.”45 Similarly, 
Otto Kirchheimer of the Frankfurt School believed that trials enable “the construction of a 
permanent, unmistakable, wall between the new beginnings and the old tyranny.”46 Currently, 
with the increasing number of transitioning countries that carry out prosecution of its past 
violators, there is a growing body of scholarly literature that puts significance in the law during a 
transitioning process. Ruti G. Teitel, a comparative law professor at New York Law School, 
writes “criminal justice offers normative legalism that helps to bridge periods of diminished rule 
of law and offers a way to express both public condemnation of past violence and the 
                                                 
43 Stephen D Krasner, "A World Could That Could Backfire," The New York Times, January 15, 2001. Accessed 
November 21, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/15/opinion/15KRAS.html 
44 Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri, "Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of International 
Justice," International Security 28.3 (2004): 35. 
45 Judith N. Shklar, Legalism: Law, Morals, and Political Trials, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986: 
145. 
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legitimation of the rule of law necessary to the consolidation of future democracy.”47 While there 
is a caveat of risk of perpetuating political injustice, Teitel argues that criminal justice offers the 
fulfillment of the potential for a renewed adherence to the rule of law.48 Thus, though there are 
risks of trials, she strongly argues for the use of strong legal mechanisms to address the past.   
More recently, leading international relations scholar Kathryn Sikkink asserts that 
nowadays, we see a norm — what she calls the justice cascade— that state officials should be 
accountable for human rights violations and that it has gained new strength and legitimacy.49 
Based on her quantitative work on Latin American countries focusing on the relationship 
between the countries that underwent transition and the countries that carried out prosecution of 
past violators, she writes that it is difficult to maintain that prosecutions destabilize democracy. 
Rather, she concludes that there is a strong correlation that those countries that prosecuted its 
past wrongdoers will more likely to have forms of democracy.50 My thesis will closely align with 
this argument favoring prosecution as necessary for democratic consolidation, and contribute to 
this ongoing debate.  
 
b) Korea’s Democratization:  Civil Society Moved Transitions, but Veto Players Halted 
Consolidation and Maintained Impunity 
In the field of South Korean democracy and South Korea’s modern history, literatures 
that argue for causes of successful democratization tend to focus not on transitional justice, but 
rather on the role played by contentious politics, specifically social movements51 of students, 
                                                 
47 Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002: 30. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World Politics, New 
York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2011: 12. 
50 Ibid., p. 148. 
51 The role of civil society and the opposition political parties during the democratization movement will be further 
investigated in Chapters 3 and 4. 
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labor activists, and church leaders. In contrast to the established literature, this thesis will 
acknowledge the role that civil society played to bring about free and fair election but also point 
out how it failed to unseat the veto-players who kept impunity entrenched.  For example, David 
Adesnik and Sunhyuk Kim argue that one of the main causes of Korea’s successful 
democratization in 1989 and not in 1979 was the increased unity of the protest movement.52 Hae 
Gu Jung and Ho Ki Kim, scholars at Stanford’s Asia-Pacific Research Center, also write that the 
“explosive growth of the protest movement led to a series of important events in 1985, which 
symbolized the democratization movement of the 1980s.” 53 The protest movements in both 
instances consisted of four constituent groups— students, labor unions, churches, and the 
parliamentary oppositions.54 In the 1979 movement, they never achieved sufficient solidarity. 
But in 1987, the movement’s constituents successfully formed and operated peak organizations 
to consolidate and plan various protests.  
 The representatives of civil society, such as Catholic Priests’ Association for Justice, 
intellectual groups such as the Council of Dismissed Professors, human rights organizations like 
the Korean Council for the Human Rights Movement, and writers’ groups like the Council of 
Writers for Practicing Freedom, enjoyed a cooperative relationship with the political opposition, 
especially the New Democratic Party with the leadership of Kim Young-Sam. 55  However, 
Adesnik and Kim argue that the cooperation between civil society and political sphere was not 
through institutionalized channels but through the close relationship between religious leaders 
and politicians from the opposition party. Also, the students and labor unions maintained strong 
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ties with religious organizations. Sunhyuk Kim wrote “the church soon became a guardian of 
young full-time dissidents, mostly composed of expelled students from colleges and universities, 
and a care provider for labor activists.”56 The churches and the unions came together under the 
groups such as the Young Catholic Workers and the Urban Industrial Mission. Students 
interacted with workers in settings such as the “night schools” that the students set up near 
factory towns. Night schools were first established to satisfy laborers’ desires higher education. 
Over time, schools’ purpose shifted to consciousness-raising programs tailored to the laborers. 
All together, the movement constituted a triple solidarity of students, laborers, and churches.57 
With the growing support and the establishment of the triple solidarity, the movement came 
together in a new peak organization called the National Movement Headquarters for Democratic 
Change. In 1987, this largely connected coalition organized several massive protests, including 
the June 26 Peace Parade that mobilized about one million protesters throughout South Korea.58 
Three days after the Peace Parade, Chun Doo-Hwan announced that the government would 
surrender to the movements’ demands.  
On the other hand, historical literatures on Korea’s previously failed attempts to 
democratize focus on different interests and ambitions by presidents, public sentiment, and 
conflicts that distracted the United States from closely intervening in South Korea. James Fowler 
argued that from 1979 to 1981, the period in which Carter maintained the presidency, the United 
States was conspicuously silent, and some scholars see this as a crucial reason that the transition 
failed.59 
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Likewise, there are relatively few scholars who focus on transitional justice, specifically 
prosecution of past violators, as a crucial process for South Korea’s democratization. One such 
scholar, Sang-Wook Han, agreed that South Korea had delayed justice, but argued that by 
delaying justice, a country could overcome or sufficiently build up civil society to absorb several 
risks that immediate prosecution poses to reconciliation. 60  Han held up South Korea as a 
successful example of a delayed justice nation, where after 60 years from the independence, 
South Korea is now able to bring justice to those human rights violators. However, I agree with 
Huntington’s warning that if trials were undertaken, they have to be carried out immediately 
after the transition or it would be impossible.61 Seeking justice through prosecution after decades 
of nothingness is a very difficult, perhaps futile process. South Korea’s truth and reconciliation 
commission, which was established in 2005, is currently at a halt due to the lack of political 
support from the National Assembly and public funding. Also, from its inception, it had no 
jurisdiction for bringing justice through prosecution. Besides President Roh Moo-Hyun’s public 
apology on massacres that occurred during the 1980’s and passing the law to investigate those 
pro-Japanese collaborators, South Korea’s truth and reconciliation commission ended without 
much investigation of the past or prosecution of wrongdoers. Han also fails to connect how 
justice, delayed or not, contributed to Korea’s democratic consolidation. Therefore, my thesis, 
which argues that prosecuting past human rights violators is a necessary step to democratization, 
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IV. Structure of the Argument 
In Chapter 1, I will delve into why prosecution is an imperative process in post-conflict 
societies, and I will break down implications that legal prosecution hold for the society. 
Examples from Guatemala, Cambodia, and Argentina will illustrate the limitations that 
institutional impunity presents and why prosecution is an effective means to achieve national 
reconciliation and to challenge impunity. This will be followed by three case study chapters on 
South Korea, respectively the 1940s, 1980s, and present, in which I will present my path 
dependency-based analysis of three critical junctures in Korea’s democratization process. Here I 
will use process tracing to identify veto players, and examine available transitional justice 
mechanisms and the consequences of not using them. Finally, I will present a conclusion chapter 
that will contain comparative analysis to make the case for reconciling the nation by facing the 




CHAPTER 1: CASES FOR PROSECUTION 
Introduction: Why Legal Justice Matters for Democratization 
In this chapter, I am going to first delve into procedures of legal prosecution and explore 
three illustrative cases from Guatemala, Cambodia, and Argentina to closely study why 
prosecution is one of the most effective processes for nations to reconcile with the past. Societies 
face the past in several different forms— whether by granting amnesty, purging, or 
prosecution— but only by legal prosecution, victims are fully recognized and defendants face the 
consequences of their actions. As legal scholar Diane Orentlicher writes, “Prosecution is the 
most effective insurance against future repression.” Prosecution, she contends, demonstrates that 
no one is above the law, thus it fosters respect for democratic institutions and deepens a society’s 
ongoing democratic culture.62 Furthermore, by revealing the truth about the violations of the past 
and punishing them, it deters future lawbreakers and prevents the public from being tempted to 
be part of state-sponsored impunity.63 Finally, governments should prosecute their predecessors’ 
atrocious crimes because trials legitimate a nation’s transition to democracy. Specifically, when a 
government prosecutes military officers for human rights abuse, it affirms the supremacy of 
publicly accountable civilian institutions.64   
Prosecution also strengthens fragile democracies because the rule of law is integral to 
democracy itself.65 According to democracy theorist Robert Dahl, political culture that supports 
stable democracies is prone to value and maintain principles of fairness, legality and due process. 
He also adds that extensive political rights and liberties [prosecution and justice] are integral to 
                                                 
62 Diane F. Orentlicher, "Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime," 
The Yale Law Journal 100.8 (1991): 2542. 
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democracy and the functioning of the institutions that distinguish modern democracy from other 
kinds of political orders.66  Though political rights and economic rights may vary from country 
to country, he acknowledges the fact that democratic nations tend to value human rights and thus, 
maintain high order of the rule of law.  
While legal prosecution is a long and complicated process, it demonstrates that no one is 
above or outside the law. As Aristotle said, “The rule of law is better than that of any individual,” 
as it provides an arena where individuals, both the accused and the accuser, are protected by the 
law and legal procedures.67 Similarly, as legal scholar Martha Minow suggests, applying the rule 
of law to prosecute those involved in mass atrocities is a very sacred process that aims to be 
insulated from the influence of politics, personal biases, and personal grudge and revenge. When 
done properly, it can establish judicial institutions where rule of law can be exercised.  Thus, for 
new democracies, a nation’s judiciary and respect for the constitution, more than elections, must 
be given special attention. Trials not only call for accountability and present evidence of harms 
done but also reparative punishment.68 After evidence is closely examined and laws are applied, 
defendants are given a verdict, a sentence. Victims have a sense of accounting for truth and 
peace. This process affirms that justice has been done and establishes precedents that there will 
be consequences for not obeying the law. 
Any prosecution of individuals for war crimes and domestic mass atrocities borrows from 
the norms and precedents set by the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials conducted after World War II.69 
These postwar trials helped to launch an international norm for human rights – the Universal 
                                                 
66 Ibid. 
67 Cited in "What Is the Rule of Law?" What Is the Rule of Law? United Nations Rule of Law. Accessed December 
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Declaration of Human Rights - and to establish a body that maintains such rights – the United 
Nations. There are several examples of domestic prosecutions that were inspired by the 
Nuremberg Trials: Israel’s prosecution of Adolph Eichmann, Argentina’s prosecution of 500 
members of the military junta involved in state terrorism, and Poland’s trial of General Jaruzelski 
for his imposition of martial law.70  
Despite these precedents, societies with historical injustice often do not prosecute. As an 
alternative to prosecution, granting amnesty to wrongdoers is frequently employed as a political 
and economic response to deal with the past. Often times, it is a decision to protect a burgeoning 
democratic regime. Scholars of democratization have argued that prosecution of wrongdoers 
from the previous regime may exacerbate conflict and push military leaders to forcefully take 
over the government. 71  Also, amnesty is granted when the new governmental body lacks 
political power and freedom to investigate and prosecute. However, the harmful effects of 
impunity are especially apparent when prosecutions are foreclosed by an amnesty law to appease 
the military or autonomous bodies. There are clear examples that show unwillingness to 
prosecute brings detrimental collateral damage to not only victims of conflicts but also all 
citizens, and society at large. It is particularly clear in the cases of Guatemala, Cambodia, and 
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In Guatemala, 36 years of domestic conflict ended in 1996 after 40,000 enforced 
disappearances and 200,000 deaths.72 In the aftermath, both the government and the opposition 
agreed to set up a truth commission, but with a body that had limited judicial power.73 The UN-
supported International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) was also set up to 
investigate abuses and raise awareness on impunity and organized crime in the country 74 . 
Recently, it has been lauded by the UN community for pushing for constitutional reform to allow 
independent judicial branch in Guatemala, but the work of the CICIG is still limited due to the 
constraint in judicial independence and the lack of transparency by the Guatemalan 
government.75 Without recognizing the victims and accounting of perpetrators, the civilians and 
military personnel who were part of mass killing maintained power in the government. The 
individuals who maintained impunity during the conflict carried out the same generalized 
attitudes and actions of corruption, self-dealing, and hubris towards the new authorities of law. 
Former military leaders got involved with drug and human trafficking with criminal gangs. They 
perpetuated the culture of violence and false authority in the new Guatemalan State. With this, 
networks of violent, criminal enterprises such as drug cartels and criminal gangs carried out 
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criminal activities with complete disregard to the rule of law and used violence against law 
enforcement.76  
In the recent years, Guatemala’s former dictator Gen. Efrain Rios Montt, a commander in 
chief responsible for massacres and forced displacement of the Maya-Ixil during his rule, was 
put on trial and convicted of crimes against humanity and received an 80-year prison term.77 
However, although human rights groups in Guatemala were optimistic that the court would stand 
defiant and no longer allow impunity for the country’s powerful, Guatemala’s Constitutional 
Court overturned his conviction just weeks after his sentencing.78 In the end, the Guatemala 
example portrays a nation tolerating wrongdoers’ long standing impunity and failing to hold 
violent individuals accountable to the rule of law. 
 
Cambodia 
In Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge, an insurgent Communist group, took control over the 
capital city, Phnom Penh in April, 1975. This marked the beginning of the Cambodian Genocide, 
in which the party enforced arbitrary executions and torture without due process and its attempts 
at agricultural reform led to devastating famine. During the four years of the Khmer Rouge’s 
repressive and authoritarian domination, about 1.5 to 3 million Cambodians died due to 
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overwork, starvation, and state-sponsored murder.79 The regime infiltrated and attacked groups 
that it saw as a threat to its power, primarily officials of the previous regime, ethnic minorities, 
college students, and scholars.  
While largely ignored by the international community, Cambodia saw a breakthrough to 
liberation when Vietnam intervened and invaded the country. The Khmer Rouge was removed 
from power in 1979 and was replaced by moderate pro-Vietnamese Communists. However, with 
support from China and Thailand, the Khmer Rouge remained active in some parts of 
Cambodia’s rural provinces and formed a coalition with resistance forces, which created a 
government in exile from bases in Thailand. Their resistance continued into the 1990s until five 
permanent members of the UN Security Council facilitated peace negotiations.80  
The Paris Agreements, signed in October of 1991, brought together four factions, 
including the Khmer Rouge, to negotiate a peaceful transition and fair governance of Cambodia. 
As a result, because it maintained popular support from the rural regions and diplomatic support 
from China, the Khmer Rouge kept its political status. The United Nations Transitional 
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) intervened to establish free and fair elections and stabilize 
governmental bodies.81 The Chinese government, which had aided and trained the Khmer Rouge 
during the civil war to help replicate China’s communism, refrained from going for the 
prosecution route and a choice was made to re-integrate former members of Khmer Rouge into 
Cambodian society at large. 82  UNTAC, deprived of judicial power to prosecute, failed to 
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comprehensively investigate and try those who were responsible for gross human rights abuses 
under the Khmer Rouge.83  
As a result, those who were part of the Khmer Rouge were installed in the new 
government. The government offered amnesty and positions in the Royal Cambodian Armed 
Forces to Khmer Rouge guerillas who continued low level warfare in the rural provinces. 
Eventually, thousands of Khmer Rouge soldiers and generals became rehabilitated without any 
punitive measures or purging. In fact, in 1996, the government granted amnesty to Ieng Sary, the 
Khmer Rouge’s right hand man who was responsible for planning and operating mass killings.84 
He accepted immunity in exchange for promising to promote peace between the Khmer Rouge 
guerillas and the government. 
In the short term, amnesty is about expedience, transitioning into a quick, seemingly 
nonviolent peace, but in the long term, it leaves out confronting the past and impunity can be felt 
throughout the society. Today, Cambodian society is still reconciling with trauma and 
devastation of the past. A generation of war, revolution, and systematic atrocities committed by 
the Khmer Rouge created a fragile society susceptible to corruption and impunity, while 
Cambodians became cynical of its tumultuous government. It has hampered nation-building 
efforts and held back economic and social development. According to a 2007 report by 
LICADHO, a major human rights organization in Cambodia, impunity was the “single most 
important area in which the country needs to make progress.”85 Cambodia, the report asserted, 
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continued to persecute political opponents and critics of the government, perpetuates impunity 
for state actors, and protects economic interests of the rich and powerful.  
Today, Cambodia holds the Cambodia Tribunal, known as the Extraordinary Chambers 
in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), which is a hybrid court between the Cambodian and 
international courts that consist of foreign judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys.86 It seeks 
to put former Khmer Rouge leaders who committed human rights abuse on trials to find peace 
and justice. While the war ended in 1998 and the tribunal was first implemented in 2007 with the 
help of UN’s assistance, some Cambodians are still disappointed by the delayed responses of the 
Cambodian court.87 For example, Ieng Sary’s death while waiting for his conviction revealed the 
court’s failure to deliver immediate accountability to Khmer Rouge atrocities. Critics would 
contend that justice delayed is justice denied.  
There is a continued feeling of delayed justice and an untold past. Several scholars today 
argue that finding justice for Cambodian victims is integral to the peace-building process in 
Cambodia. The Khmer Rouge Tribunal, which was established in 1997, produced few 
achievements due to its poor tribunal design and the challenges of the trials.88 Yet, justice has 
revealed itself to be a fundamental element in healing the victims’ trauma, bringing 
reconciliation, and building peace in Cambodia. 89  A nationwide population-based survey 
conducted in December 2010 by the Human Rights Center at the University of California-
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Berkeley reported that 82.9% still felt hatred toward the Khmer Rouge, while 71.5% wanted 
those criminals to be physically tortured. 90 Also, in another survey on Cambodian victims’ 
opinions on justice and national reconciliation by the Center for Social Development, before the 
trial on Khmer Rouge leaders took place, the majority of the victims had reported that they 
would feel justice if those who were part of the Khmer Rouge would be prosecuted. 91 
Accordingly, there is a general consensus among scholars, based on reports and surveys on the 
victims, that justice would be served for the victims if the perpetrators would be tried; otherwise 
victims will continue to live in trauma and misery.  
 
Argentina 
Finally, in contrast to Guatemala and Cambodia, Argentina faced first prosecutions, then 
amnesty and then prosecution again after military repression. Despite presidential pardons to 
military generals who had committed human rights abuses, the nation came back to prosecuting 
military leaders after 20 years of constant push by human rights groups and victims’ families. 
Argentina presents an interesting transitional justice story to the world that prosecution in a 
timely manner is one of the best tools, after all, to deal with past crimes.  
 With the recent and ongoing success in the prosecution of human rights crimes, it is 
evident that Argentina has one of the best records of utilizing prosecution as transitional justice 
in the world. In the 1970’s, political repression led to massive numbers of deaths, prolonged 
arbitrary arrests, disappearances, unfair trials, and pervasive torture. As the commanders-in-chief 
of Argentina’s three armed forces ousted President Isabel Peron in 1976, the military proclaimed 
                                                 
90 Phuong Pham, Patrick Vinck, Mychelle Balthazard, Sokhom Hean, and Eric Stover, So We Will Never Forget: A 
Population-based Survey on Attitudes about Social Reconstruction and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia, Rep.: CA: Human Rights Center, University of California, Berkeley, June, 2011. 




a de facto regime. Under their control, they practiced forced disappearances as the most 
notorious feature of repression, and an estimated 30,000 people were abducted by security 
forces.92 They were sent to secret detention centers, where they were inhumanely tortured and 
interrogated. Many of them were systematically and secretly murdered. In 1983, before 
democracy was restored, the military regime granted itself immunity from any prosecution and 
destroyed any documents relevant to the military’s repression. 
Raul Alfonsin, Argentina’s first democratically elected president after military rule, 
started his presidency with a weak democratic structure and a strong military that avoided any 
accountability. Nonetheless, he created a National Commission on Disappeared Persons 
(CONADEP) to investigate these crimes.93 In its 1983 report, Nunca Más (“Never Again”), it 
listed numbers of victims and detention centers where individuals were murdered and tortured 
under the authority of the armed forces. In 1985, nine former members of the military juntas that 
were charged with human rights abuse were successfully prosecuted in a major landmark trial. 
The trials began just 18 months after the military government left power and led to the 
conviction of former presidents Jorge Rafael Videla, and Roberto Eduardo Viola, the Admirals 
Emilio Eduardo Masera and Armando Lambruschini, and Brigadier General Orlando Ramon 
Agosti.94 More than 800 witnesses were presented and the trial covered 700 individual cases 
taken from the CONADEP’s case files.95 
The trials and the Nunca Mas report encouraged more prosecutions and strengthened the 
ground for the rule of law in Argentina. They gave weight to demands of victims and their 
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families to investigate crimes committed by other military perpetrators. However, the call for 
trial also allowed authoritarian factions to voice their demands against the prosecution. The 
military threatened to launch a coup against the Alfonsin government numerous times, which led 
to the amnesty laws. Under this pressure, Alfonsin resigned and called early elections.96 In 1986 
and 1987, laws such as Full Stop and Due Obedience, were enacted as a compromise between 
“democratic stability and impunity demands.”97 They allowed blanket amnesty and immediate 
halt of the majority of the investigations. Also, Alfonsin’s successor Carlos Menem granted 
presidential pardons to the military leaders convicted in the 1985 military junta trials and few 
other individuals who faced continued investigation after the impunity laws. The Menem 
administration believed that national pacification through amnesty was the key to move 
Argentine society forward, even though many were actually not ready to move on. As a result, 
the administration passed laws to discourage prosecution and fact-finding of the past.  
Despite the compromises, Argentina’s human rights movement continued to push for 
accountability in both domestic and international settings, and over time they were successful. In 
the early 1990s, they first persuaded Argentine federal courts to conduct “truth trials,” which are 
a judicially-created procedure to obtain official information about the fate of victims before the 
criminal courts.98 In 1996, victims’ relatives also filed several cases in Spanish courts under 
universal jurisdiction, which led to the issuance of arrest warrants and extradition requests. In 
March 2001, federal judge Gabriel Cavallo found that the Full Stop and Due Obedience laws 
were unconstitutional under Argentina’s international human rights obligations.99 In July 2005, 
the National Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Court of Appeals’ decision in the case of Julio 
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Hector Simon, a leader of the Argentinean Federal Police during the military dictatorship from 
1976 to 1983, bringing charges against Simon relating to kidnapping, torture, and forced 
disappearance of persons, and many more cases were reopened.100 In 2006, an appellate court 
also declared unconstitutional the earlier pardons of the junta members who were convicted in 
1985 and it was followed by a 2007 ruling of the Supreme Court, which also declared the 
invalidity of Menem’s presidential pardon.101 
According to the International Center for Transitional Justice, Argentine authorities 
express strong support for prosecuting past crimes today.102 More than 600 accused face criminal 
counts before federal courts and 62 defendants have been sentenced.103 Unlike the 1980s trials, 
today’s trials prosecute not only key leaders but also direct perpetrators including civilians, 
priests, judges, and former ministers. However, some in the human rights circle in Argentina 
voice a concern that the key to success in Argentina’s transitional justice is time. The scope of 
investigation is massive, witnesses and victim protection system is lacking, and evidence relating 
to military repression is being destroyed. Thus, they argue that holding the trials at a speedy and 
responsive pace would allow Argentina to finally come to terms with its past.104  
 
Assessment: Transitional Justice, Prosecution, and the Case of South Korea 
As seen in the illustrated cases, transitional justice is a very complicated and politically-
sensitive stage for any post-conflict society. Some nations, among them Guatemala, Cambodia 
and Argentina, in hopes of moving forward with national reconciliation, granted amnesty to war 
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criminals and human rights violators, but it rather consolidated the culture of impunity  
throughout the country. As was the case in Cambodia, some citizens felt that they were not 
compensated for their pain and suffering while criminals became more violent and operated 
above the law. In Guatemala, amnesty allowed former military officials and violent criminals to 
carry out large-scale drug and human trafficking. However, as can be seen in the case of 
Argentina, this country returned to prosecution after 20 years of presidential pardon and even 
failed coup attempts. With the help of an active human rights movement of civilian groups and 
victims’ families, it has had more transitional human rights trials than any other country in the 
world and has enjoyed its longest continuous period of democratic rule since 1983. According to 
Sikkink, there are no data that human rights trials have contributed to undermining democracy in 
the region, including Argentina.105 Examples from the listed countries reveal that amnesty is a 
useful tool for certain political and economic conditions. However, their examples showed the 
world that when a window of opportunity to prosecute and bring justice opens, it must be fully 
utilized. The failure to hold trials during transitional justice makes it even harder to do it in the 
future. Unresolved problems in the past exacerbate and fester, and they become a rot of the 
society that institutionalizes impunity and protects veto-players. Granting amnesty in Time 1 
may reinforce impunity and further corruption of the state in Time 2. It produces a negative 
social impact that carries over time due to the culture of injustice and unresolved problems. Thus, 
prosecution should be given the utmost weight and importance for any nations reckoning itself 
from trauma, brutality, and human rights crimes.  
Similarly, I will argue that the same is true for the case of South Korea. Using process 
tracing to identify critical junctures in South Korea’s historical and political narrative, I will 
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demonstrate how the lack of prosecution in Korean society is related to its delayed democratic 
consolidation. In Chapter 2, I will examine the post-colonialism period from the mid-1940 to the 
late 1950’s when a newly independent Korean government failed to investigate and prosecute 
pro-Japanese collaborators who had committed heinous human rights crimes. In Chapter 3, I will 
illustrate how the lack of prosecution against the Park Chung-Hee’s regime following the 
dictator’s assassination in 1979 further consolidated the culture of impunity and disregard for the 
rule of law into the 1980s. Then in Chapter 4, I will profile present day Korea’s status on truth 
and reconciliation, and examine the effect that an unresolved past and injustice continue to hold 
on today’s Korean society, more than two decades after the much-celebrated transition in the late 








Just as the end of the World War II brought the collapse of authoritarian regimes in 
Germany, Italy, and Japan, it also brought new opportunities for post-World War II colonies to 
create their own independent democratic states through the process of decolonization. However, 
the tasks of overcoming colonial legacies and building a new democratic system were left 
unfulfilled, to be tackled by colonized states at a later time. Korea was not an exception to this. It 
had been colonized by Japan since 1910, and the surrender of the Japanese in 1945 brought forth 
a political task to create an independent Korean national government. The majority of Koreans 
wished for a new free and fair nation that would move past decades of oppression and 
humiliation. They also expected former Korean collaborators with the Japanese regime and 
Japanese authorities to be prosecuted. However, following the Japanese departure, the bipolar 
rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union ensued in the Korean peninsula 
internationally and domestically. This rivalry led the two super powers to scramble for spheres of 
influence in Korea, and as a result, the fight for spreading ideology took priority over self-
government and nation-building for the people of the land. 
On September 6, 1945, just weeks after independence from Japan, the Korean People’s 
Republic (KPR), a de facto government under the leadership of Yo Un-hyung was formed to 
govern the South of the Korean peninsula’s 38th parallel. However, as the U.S. Army, led by 
Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, arrived in Seoul, the U.S. authorities not only refused to 
recognize the republic but also officially declared it illegal.106 They instead established the U.S. 
Military Government (USMG), which ruled until the pro-U.S. Republic of Korea was founded 
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after three years. North of the 38th parallel, the Soviets helped create the pro-communist 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. 
The superpowers, who each wanted the whole Korean peninsula to be under its sole 
control, did not get their wish. The Moscow agreement of December 1945 to work out a four 
power trusteeship, among Great Britain, the U.S., China, and Soviet Union, for a period of five 
years failed due to disagreement between the two powers, and Korean’s wish to found a new 
state free of colonial legacies never materialized.107 The trusteeship, an international overseeing 
device created by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt during the Yalta Conference in February 
1945, was a crucial tool to focus U.S. involvement and maintain U.S. interest in Korea while 
allowing time to reconstruct Japan. The notion that “Koreans are incapable of self-governing” 
was widespread among the four trustees and other nations, and it had been exploited by Japan to 
justify its colonial rule.108 The superpowers failed to heed the Korean people’s anticipation for 
immediate self-rule. As a result, it led to the division between the North and the South, and the 
process of the separation was violent and costly. It was a critical origin of the Korean War.  
Meanwhile, the Rhee administration worked aligned to the interests of the U.S. and 
reflected policies that completely disregarded its own citizens’ wish to bring justice by 
prosecuting wrongdoers relating to the Japanese colonial era. In this chapter I will argue that the 
Rhee administration’s annulment of attempts to punish pro-Japanese collaborators marked a 
crucial turning point in Korean history – what path dependency analysis would call a “critical 
juncture.” The failure to prosecute wrongdoers positioned Korea onto a pathway that allowed 
impunity and internal corruption within Korean society. The Rhee government maintained a 
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paucity of accounting and this diminished its legitimacy While this was one of the early 
opportunities to establish a true and legitimate democracy, the Rhee administration repressed its 
own citizens by enacting laws to completely curtail political dissent and by overseeing multiple 
massacres that led to the death of between 600,000 and 1,200,000 victims.109  
Thus, in this chapter, I will analyze this critical juncture by first describing veto-players 
of this moment, and then explain impunity that hindered the democratic development of the 
newly-independent Korean state.  Delving into the players and impunity will facilitate a better 
understanding of the nature of injustice and the pathway that slowed down the process of 
establishing a democratic nation. After examining these two topics, I will discuss the path-
dependent implications of impunity that retrogressed Korea’s democracy.   
 
Veto-Players 
To start, I have identified two categories of veto-players in this era: External (the United) 
States Military Government in Korea) and Internal (the Rhee administration; former Japanese 
collaborators in and out of the state; and the Republic of Korea military).  
 
United States Military Government in Korea 
The United States was a power group that tried to veto transitional justice in South Korea. 
Rather than allowing Koreans to build a self-governing body that would reflect the interest of its 
citizens and create a free and fair society, the U.S. applied paternalistic policies to control 
Korean society.  
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The role of the U.S. in the Korean peninsula during this particular moment chronicles 
back to the Cairo Declaration in 1943, when the U.S. declared that it was committed to a free 
Korea. Roosevelt remarked the famous phrase, “in due course Korea shall become 
independent.”110   
 



















WWII ended; Liberation of Korea; US military occupation began 
 
The Korean People’s Republic (KPR), a de facto government, under the 
leadership of Yo Un-hyung was formed, but becomes disbanded. U.S. Military 
Government (USMG) led by Lieutenant General John R. Hodge is formed. 
 
The Moscow agreement among Great Britain, the U.S., and Soviet Union to 
work out a four power trusteeship was introduced.  
 
Jeju's April 3 Massacre 
 
The Republic of Korea established 
 
The Anti-Collaboration Act was passed, Anti-Collaboration Committee was 
created and started investigating pro-Japanese collaborators. Investigation 




Source: Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Korea, Truth and Reconciliation: Activities of the Past Three 
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However, little planning took place between the Cairo meeting and the landing of American 
forces at Inchon harbor on September 9, 1945. The U.S. policy in postwar Korea in general 
demonstrated a lack of vision, planning, and coordination between the branches of the U.S. 
national government and with the U.S. personnel in Korea.  
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When the 25,000 men of 24th Corps of the U.S. Army led by Lieutenant General John R. 
Hodge arrived in Seoul in September 8, 1945, it was the beginning of official American control 
over South Korea. However, General Hodge, an experienced World War II veteran, lacked 
knowledge of Korea, except that provided by the Japanese Government-General.111 Hodge was 
ignorant of the fact that Koreans wanted rectification of the past wrong doings of the Japanese 
colonial era and a new independent nation. He closely listened to the Japanese authorities and 
their allegations that Korea’s new, quasi self-government— the KPR— incited communistic 
ideals towards immediate independence. The Japanese claim was a blanket assertion that clearly 
mischaracterized the nature of the organization. Instead of the professed American goal of 
helping Korea’s new nation-building, a wish that the majority of Koreans desired, Hodge 
followed America’s own national and global aim of resisting influences from the Soviet Union. 
As a result, the U.S. tore down the KPR, and officially made it illegal to create any self-
governing body and prohibited all political activities until the U.S. set up an anti-communist 
regime in South Korea. However, according to Jeon, the more recent consensus among 
revisionist scholars argues that the KPR was more nationalist than communist, had considerable 
popular support, and advocated a social and economic movement desired by the majority of 
Koreans.112 General Hodge went as far as to declare Korea to be “the enemy of the United States” 
and ordered his troops to carry out everything according to the customs fitting an enemy 
country.113 While Koreans welcomed the U.S. troops as an army of liberation, the U.S. forces 
nevertheless equated Korea as a provocative, dangerous state.  
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At that time, Korea was not regarded as a sovereign state according to international law, 
despite having been freed from Japan.114 The U.S. forces capitalized on this legal distinction, and 
thus, claimed authority over all “ownerless land,” which provided the legal basis of the 
occupation of the Korean peninsula. In place of the KPR, the U.S. set up a formal U.S. Army 
Military Government in Korea (AMG) and dismantled most of local committees of the KPR, 
replacing them with a discredited colonial administrative structure throughout the country. 
Rather than rely on Korean politicians, the Military Government recruited discharged Japanese 
as “administrative advisors” and endorsed the Korean Democratic Party, which was made up of 
former Japanese collaborators. As a result, the eleven members of the Korean Advisory Council 
were largely members of the KDP.115 The actions of the U.S. occupation force quickly ended 
Korean expectations that liberation from Japan would result in national independence and 
political autonomy for the whole peninsula. 
While the U.S. forces occupied Korea, it attempted to form a joint supervision by the 
United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China. However, the trusteeship decision was 
a disappointment to Koreans. Political independence and the punishment of collaborators did not 
happen. The United States in this era lacked concrete and long-term goals to build a democratic 
nation, and Korea’s true post-independence was secondary to its goals. The policies that they 
advanced favored conservatives, which included a good number of Japanese collaborators, and 
thus, the expectation of rectifying Japanese colonialism was never realized.  Finally, it gave 
priority to global anti-communist priorities, and associated Korean nationalism with a potential 
communist threat.  For all of these reasons, the U.S. used its power to “veto” attempts at legal 
justice. 
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Former Japanese Collaborators In and Out of the State 
After Korea’s independence, the U.S. military government decided to maintain the 
bureaucratic personnel and institutions from the Japanese colonial government. As a result, it 
was nearly impossible to punish collaborators without permission from USAMGIK, which 
protected the reemployment of collaborator personnel while controlling people’s zeal for severe 
punishment. Collaborators transformed themselves into bureaucrats and the pro-American forces 
continuously bolstered their new social status.  
Many collaborators maintained posts in the Korean Democratic Party under the 
leadership of Rhee Syng-Man. In September 1948, the Anti-Collaboration Act was passed in the 
National Assembly, with a committee to appoint a special judge and a special prosecutor to carry 
out the preparatory investigation of collaboration. 116  Yet, former collaborators hindered the 
legislation process and activities of the Anti-Collaboration Committee with threats, instigation of 
mass demonstration, and terrorist acts. There was even an attempted assassination of a member 
of the Anti-Collaboration Committee by some high-ranking police officers who had collaborated 
with imperial Japan.117 
 Collaborators thus further achieved a rise in status and climbed the social ladder to the 
ruling class. Under the Rhee administration, as much as 34 percent of department ministers and 
68 percent of chief justices and justices of the Supreme Court were collaborators, while making 
up a quarter of the National Assembly.118 In 1960, 70% of senior superintendents, 40% of police 
captains, and 15% of police lieutenants had all served in the Japanese colonial government and 
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still remained as police officers following liberation.119  Statistics compiled by a private research 
organization indicate that among the highest public officials in Korean society in the early 1980s, 
121 were collaborators, including the president, chief justice, prime minister, chiefs of the staff 
in the Army, Navy, and Air Force, prosecutors, senior superintendents, mayors, and provincial 
governors.120 
Collaborators became elites in the economy, media, education, culture, art, and religion 
in postcolonial Korean society.121 Unresolved Issues in History, a book published in South Korea 
investigating former Korean collaborators with the Japanese regime, includes articles on 60 
collaborators and their personal backgrounds, most of whom were in positions of leadership in 
every area of Korean society after liberation. 122  In particular, they played crucial roles in 
maintaining the anticommunist dictatorship and in the modernization process in South Korea. 
They became credited as public servants and patriots, while those who had fought for 
independence against the Japanese became victims of anti-communism sentiment. Accordingly, 
collaborators dominated Korean society following the independence. Despite their past 
wrongdoings and benefits from Imperial Japan, the former Japanese collaborators quickly erased 
their past for their benefit and amassed veto-power over transitional justice during the Rhee era.  
 
The Rhee Administration 
Another veto-player that resisted legal justice was the Rhee administration, which was a 
conservative coalition that protected former Japanese collaborators. In May 1948, the Korean 
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National Assembly adopted a constitution setting forth a presidential form of government 
specifying a four-year term for the presidency. Rhee Syng-Man, a Princeton-educated politician, 
was especially favored by the U.S. because of his conservative stance against communism. The 
U.S. played an influential role in deciding the head of the state, as the leftist faction of the 
political sphere was marginalized and maintained little voice in the National Assembly. Soon, 
Rhee became head of the new Assembly. Then, on August 15, 1948, the Republic of Korea 
(South Korea) was proclaimed, Rhee assumed the presidency with the backing of the U.S. 
Politically, Rhee controlled the nation with an iron fist. He unilaterally amended the constitution 
to change his term limits to four, while threatening to dissolve the National Assembly if it failed 
to support his power grab.123 The National Assembly was a unicameral body, and a majority was 
made up of Rhee’s supporters.124  
Leading a new nation healing itself from its colonial past, Rhee relied heavily upon the 
United States for both financial and political help. Specifically, the policy of the Rhee 
administration was one of “unification by force,” in which the government allowed no room for 
suspicious acts of communism in the South. With no adherence to due process, even judges and 
prosecutors faced arrests when they ruled favorably to those who were imprisoned for suspicions 
of communist acts.125 As a result, the Rhee administration carried out multiple massacres that led 
to the death of hundreds of thousands of innocent citizens. Rhee’s implementation of 
authoritarian and conservative policies made him veto looking into the past. There must have 
been something that Rhee refrained to disclose.  
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 One significant, tragic massacre that occurred during the Rhee administration was the 
massacre of the NGA (Kuk-min-bo-do-yeon-maeng) members. Formed in 1938 by former 
nationalists and leftists, the NGA became a crucial target for Rhee’s postcolonial state. By 
preserving the colonial forms and procedures, the NGA was targeted to advance the South Korea 
state project of converting and defeating nationalists and others who had once demanded the 
punishment of former collaborators. Its members, numbering three hundred thousand, reported 
regularly to the police and were used by them as an informant network. It has been alleged that 
many of its members were innocent farmers and civilians who lacked knowledge of ideological 
conflicts but were forced to register.126 They were pressured to cooperate with the new state by 
promoting voluntary confessions, persuading political prisoners to convert. While some worried 
that their past could arouse the new government’s suspicion, they nonetheless came under 
suspicion when the government rounded them up. Especially on the day that North Korea 
invaded the South in 1950, the Security Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs ordered the 
police to detail all members of the NGA nationwide and eliminate them in silence.127 This event 
is one of many horrifying acts of violence that the Rhee administration carried out to get rid of 
any individuals or organizations that were suspicious of being communists and those who called 
for the prosecution of former Japanese collaborators.   
 On a mission to defeat the Red Peril, the Rhee administration failed to move the nation 
from its postcolonial damages. Rather, it persecuted its citizens on the ground of unreasonable 
suspicion and awarded former Japanese collaborators with posts in cabinet and military 
leaderships.128 The government, uncertain of its future between the United States and the Soviet 
                                                 
126 Ji-Sook Bae, "Gov’t Killed 3,400 Civilians During War." The Korea Times. March 2, 2009. Accessed October 10, 
2013. http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2009/03/117_40555.html.  
127 Jae-Jung Suh, "Truth And Reconciliation In South Korea." Critical Asian Studies 42.4 (2010): 518. 
128 Bruce Cumings, Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History. New York: W.W. Norton, 1997: 201. 
Yang 55 
 
Union, heavily repressed political activities to prevent any leftist organizing and pursued pro-
American policies.  
 
The Republic of Korea Military  
With U.S. financial support, the Korean military under the Rhee administration, 
specifically the Korean National Police and special military units, tightened the regime’s grasp 
over domestic politics. The Korean military often declared the state of emergency as a 
convenient excuse for the regime to crack down on any of Rhee’s opposition. While the Republic 
of Korea (ROK) military was created for the purpose of combat situations, Rhee specialized 
several divisions within the military to be used for political purposes.129 
 Military and police units were especially vicious in taking revenge on South Koreans 
who had cooperated with the North Korean military during the early months of the war. In the 
summer of 1950, when the Korean People’s Army (KPA), the North Korean military, occupied 
the majority of ROK territory, some South Koreans had assisted North Korean forces in 
reestablishing the North’s self-government, seizing and redistributing Japanese property, and 
maintaining order. When the U.S. and ROK troops recaptured the territory south of the 38th 
parallel in September of 1950, the South Korean police and army mercilessly punished and 
slaughtered collaborators with the North.130 
 Rhee himself also used the military to hold onto power.  In July 1952, when the National 
Assembly refused to pass Rhee’s constitutional amendment calling for the president to be chosen 
by direct election instead of by the assembly, Rhee declared martial law and ordered military 
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police units to hold the lawmakers hostage until they finally agreed to his proposal.131 With this 
military tactic, Rhee was able to extend his tenure in office again in 1956.132  
During the mid- and late 1950s the State Department received a constant stream of 
communications from American diplomats detailing the ways that Rhee was using the national 
police and army units to intimidate and control his opponents. One State Department official 
who was stationed in Korea during 1957 said that the “Executive will is enforced by a 
centralized national police,” which was deeply involved in political affairs, especially the 
surveillance of opposition groups.” 133  Rhee used both the ROK Army Counter Intelligence 
Corps and the Joint Provost Marshal Command “for security as well as political actions.”134 For 
the Rhee administration, these special units were useful in both preventing insurgency and 
controlling sources of political dissent until the late 1950s.135  
The military was a forceful, systematic veto-player that was protected by the elites and 
politics of the Korean society. It was able to stand strong against accusations of impunity and 
tried to brand itself as a positive force that would save the nation from communist influences. 
Yet, in fact, it persecuted its own citizens and maintained a stronghold on its privileges, while 
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Impunity and collective amnesia went hand in hand as the Rhee administration did not 
merely exonerate those who had committed grave crimes of violence, terrorism, and mass 
killings. It justified its actions as necessary to stem communism, and praised the perpetrators for 
risking their lives to fight communism.  
In the 1940s after the Japanese surrender, many Koreans who were collaborators with the 
Japanese regime were absolved of their past crimes and were protected by the Rhee 
administration. Since it was more convenient for the occupational government to recruit 
experienced Korean administrators from the former Japanese governmental apparatus, these 
individuals were not punished even after the nation’s independence even though many of them 
had willingly cooperated with Japanese colonial rule. The U.S. Military government employed 
them in spite of their past, and they later secured high-ranking positions in the Rhee 
government.136 The U.S. policy of absolving Korean collaborators to the Japanese regime from 
the Tokyo Tribunal was in line with the occupation policy of the U.S. Military Government in 
Korea.137 This policy judged Japanese-trained soldiers, intelligence agents, and police officers to 
be useful in the suppression of communist operations in South Korea. Yet, in return, their violent 
tactics and abuses brought fear and terror to Korean citizens.  
Calls for the prosecution of Japanese collaborators in order to obtain historical justice 
were not easily dismissed. Even President Rhee, who aligned himself with many of the former 
collaborators, felt compelled to accept the Act and used executive powers to create a body to 
investigate and prosecute Japanese collaborators in accordance with the law.138 However, the 
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first attempt at historical justice and truth did not last long. As soon as the committee was formed, 
it began to be assaulted by conservatives who were former collaborators or had aligned 
themselves with collaborators for personal gain. The Rhee government hindered the Act’s 
implementation by accusing the committee of communist-influenced leadership and protesting 
that the Act might be misused to arrest “patriots” who had fought against the communists.  
In December 1948, the government enacted the National Security Law, a continuation of 
the former security Maintenance Law of Imperial Japan, and revived the Japanese-style police 
apparatus that had been notorious for torturing those who struggled for Korea’s independence.139 
The Rhee government annulled legislative attempts to prosecute pro-Japanese collaborators; in 
doing so he exonerated those who had committed grave crimes against their fellow countrymen 
on behalf of Imperial Japan. This marked a crucial turning point. After, government officials, 
police officers, and military officials who had cooperated with Imperial Japan were able to retain 
their power during the Rhee government and subsequent military regimes. Some who had 
previously held positions in the Japanese police’s intelligence agency were recruited into the G-2 
Sections and Counter Intelligence Corps.140 Freed from judicial prosecution, the Japanese-trained 
soldiers and police took vengeance on nationalists and specifically those who had demanded 
historical justice in the postliberation years. The former collaborators quickly transformed 
themselves into patriotic anticommunists.141 In order to consolidate their power, they exercised 
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Implications of Impunity for Korea’s Democracy 
The exoneration and empowerment of pro-Japanese police and bureaucrats led Koreans 
to lose faith in their government. It created a culture of distrust that encouraged political unrest 
and on-going social conflicts across the country.  Dissent, distrust, and disillusionment filled the 
country. As the country moved away from unification, frustrated by the partition of the peninsula, 
the left in Korea went against the impunity-based Rhee regime.   
This unstable public sentiment and political sphere led to the Jejudo and Yeosun 
Incidents, both in 1948. In Jejudo, hundreds of partisan forces rebelled against the general 
election that was set to legitimize national division. The Korean National Police and military, 
supported by U.S. troops, opened fire on the group and took control over Jeju Island. Out of 
150.000 residents, 30,000 were known to have been killed for their involvement with the 
guerillas.142 Following this event, in Yeosun, approximately 2,000 left-wing soldiers rebelled 
against the government in protest against its heavy-handed clampdown on the uprising in Jeju. 
Soldiers seized weapons and took control of the town. Soon, the South Korean army, with the 
help of U.S. military advisers, overwhelmed the rebels. Today, the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of Korea (TRKC) has confirmed that the number of casualties tally up to 439.143 
The Rhee government responded to such mobilization by the political opposition by instituting 
martial law, whereby field officers arrested and killed civilians based on their own interpretation 
of law.  
The administration allowed the use of torture by the Korean National Police and military, 
lynching, and even summary executions to promote anticommunism. The Rhee government 
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ignored due process of law and judicial process as a whole, and it regularly committed violations 
of human rights. Intelligence agencies were able to coerce and intimidate judges and warnings 
were routinely issued to the courts. 144 The empowerment of Japanese collaborators and the 
failure to bring justice in the case of past wrongdoings culminated in the mass civilian killings 
the Rhee government committed before and during the Korean War. Justice was denied for the 
sake of eliminating any communist influence, and it deprived everyday citizens of fundamental 
rights and took the lives of many.  
The experience of the Korean War firmly consolidated the injustices of the postliberation 
years. The war legitimated and developed the military, and it became the one of the most 
organized and influential forces in South Korean society. As a result, anticommunist ideology 
penetrated ordinary Koreans daily lives, taking away from public discourse such inconvenient 
truths as the corruption of state power and the mass killings of innocent civilians by Korean 
police. Everyday citizens were taught to fear state power, remain quiet about the past, and 
distance themselves from political procedures. The Rhee government, though elections and 
modern judicial systems were enacted, was a mere procedural democracy that was hungry for the 
attention of the United States while interests of its citizens became void.  
 
Conclusion 
On August 15, 1945, as soon as the Japanese surrender was confirmed, Koreans all across 
the peninsula came out to the streets, yelling out “Manse!” and “Haebang!” which meant 
freedom and liberation from Japan. They naturally expected that after decades of humiliation and 
both physical and emotional toil under the Japanese regime, their lives would be renewed under a 
new independent state. However, their freedom was never truly free. Korean’s first 
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independently created self-government was disbanded by the U.S. Military. When Rhee, with the 
backing of U.S., became the first president of Republic of Korea, his administration went along 
with U.S. policies for a pro-American government and for quick nation-building from the chaos 
and political vacuum of post-colonialism. Yet his conservative coalition brought lenient charges 
against former Japanese collaborators and employed them to heavily repress their fellow citizens.  
The failure to disrupt the remains of colonial bureaucracy at this critical juncture of 
Korea’s liberation led to the development of state terrorism, human rights abuses, paucity of due 
process, and importantly, disconnection with its own citizens. State elites, who had benefitted 
from the Japanese colonial government, maintained their posts in national governmental 
apparatus and consolidated their power.  While there were efforts to rectify the colonial past, 
they were soon brought to a stop by Cold War ideological conflicts.  
Today, “truth and reconciliation” scholar Jae-Jung Suh argues that rectification of the 
Japanese colonial era was a necessary step towards historical justice and the transformation of 
Korean politics.145 The United States should have focused less on quick nation-building, and 
more on bringing strict adherence to the rule of law, mass political participation of citizens, and 
allowing civil society to form. While experienced personnel were needed for infrastructure 
within the governmental structure, setting a strong precedent that past wrongdoers would be 
prosecuted was needed to set an example of respecting and adhering to the law. As a result, the 
cold war distractions and political repression located Korea onto a path that institutionalized 
impunity and allowed veto-players to rule the society with violent repression. This 
disillusionment and illegitimacy filled the Rhee era, and it paved a way for the public’s 
discontent and distrust, then soon to a violent military takeover in 1961. 
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CHAPTER 3: 1980s – SPRING DID NOT COME TO SEOUL  
Introduction:  1979-80, Korea’s Next Critical Juncture 
In 1961, the Rhee administration was toppled by military coup under the leadership of 
General Park Chung-Hee, a graduate of a Japanese military academy in Manchuria. The military 
justified the coup by claiming it needed to save Korea from communist influences. One of the 
main reasons for the fall of the Rhee government was its incompetence in ruling the country. The 
Rhee administration did not respond to various demands from below after the Korean War, nor 
did it properly control the military. The military was strong enough to counter the transition to 
democracy because it was the de facto monopolized physical power and developed over time 
with the financial support of the U.S. since the Korean War.   
After taking over the presidency, Park aggressively promoted economic development 
policies. The success of his economic development plans offset the lack of legitimacy, which is 
evident in his landslide win in the 1967 presidential election. However, his economic miracle, 
which had sacrificed the rights and dignity of working class and middle class Koreans, faced 
growing opposition from labor unions and workers. Students and dissidents led massive protests 
against Park’s repressive policies.  
The discontent against the Park’s regime’s repression and the democratic movement’s 
resistance created a divide within state elites. As a result, the KCIA chief, Kim Chae-Kyu, 
assassinated Park on October 26, 1979.146 His assassination opened up the prospect of regime 
change in South Korea, and expectations for democratization were higher than ever.  
This particular moment of opening for democracy was known as the “Seoul Spring” of 
1979-1980, and this moment was another critical juncture for South Korea’s political 
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development.147 With the wave of democratization that ended authoritarian regimes across the 
world, the time was ripe for Korea to end its decades-old dictatorship. There were opposition 
parties, increasingly based on the middle class, and student and labor movements grew to protest 
against the stagnant processes for democratization. Equally importantly, Korea encountered rapid 
industrialization. To seize this opportunity for democratization, it was urgent to determine a 
schedule for democratic transition in a transparent and speedy manner. It required a 
constitutional amendment to mitigate the executive branch’s power and a free and fair civilian 
election with opposing parties.  
Contrary to public expectations for democratization, however, the plan for democratic 
transition was obscure during the Seoul Spring. The transitional government under President 
Choi Kyu-Ha failed to repeal the remnants of Park’s repressive structure of the government. 
Choi, who was a strict administrator by nature and not a charismatic leader, was reluctant to 
present a concrete plan for democratization. Then, on December 12, 1979, hard-line General 
Chun Doo-Hwan seized power within the army, which gradually darkened the prospect of 
democratization.148 Nonetheless, the democratization movement quickly spread during April and 
early May of 1980. Students and union workers protested the delayed transition to democracy 
and pressured for its speedy progress. Yet, in the end, Seoul’s Spring could not be achieved. 
Having seized military power through the December 12th coup, Chun’s forces took power from 
the Choi administration by declaring martial law on May 17, 1980. By this point, most of the 
efforts for democratization came to a halt.   
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In this chapter, I will present a case study of this second “window of opportunity” for 
democracy that produced neither democracy nor justice in Korea.  I will first identify the veto-
players of the era. There were multiple influential players who held both political and economic 
power and who wanted to keep that power in the post-Park era. Closely examining their powerful 
networks within Korean society will reveal the choices that located Korea onto the impunity path, 
and how they were remains of the colonial and dictatorial legacy. Then, I address how the path 
of impunity was further consolidated during the 1970s and the 1980s. As former Japanese 
collaborators solidified their stance in the state and civil society and their wrongdoings were left 
untackled, the Park and Chun regimes used both human rights violations and political corruption 
to amend the political system as they wished. Thus, the impunity section will focus on the lack of 
accounting for the crimes of these violent regimes and lack of transparency for those who 
became silent victims of what was called the Yushin system in which the executive held 
indefinite power. Then, after examining impunity, I will carry out an in-depth analysis of the 
critical juncture of the Seoul Spring itself (October 1979-May 1980). While the circumstance and 
time was right for democracy, democratic transition failed to take root. Thus, I am going to 
investigate the significance of lack of prosecution of human rights abuse in a democratically 


























May 16, military coup under the leadership of General Park Chung-Hee 
 
Park Chung-Hee was elected president  
 
Park Chung-Hee wins general presidential election 
 
Revitalizing (Yushin) Reforms proclaimed 
 
President Park Chung-Hee assassinated 
 
General Chun Doo-Hwan seized power within the military 
 
May 18 Gwangju Democratization Movement occurs, but the military quickly 
repressed the protest movement with force. 
 
General Chun Doo-Hwan took office as president 
 
Source: Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Korea, Truth and Reconciliation: Activities of the Past Three 
Years 18, 29 (2009). Accessed February 2, 2014. http://justicespeaking.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/trc-report.pdf 
 
Veto-Players 
In the time between October 1979 and May 1980 in South Korea, the main veto-players resisting 
accountability for human rights abuses were U.S. corporations, American domestic politics, and 
the military’s Hanahoe club.  
 
U.S. Corporations 
American business interests played a key role in South Korea, as the Park and Chun 
administrations pushed for modernization policies. For American business leaders, democratic 
reform in South Korea was a secondary concern to economic liberalization. As long as they were 
able to seek the bottom line for their shareholders and a stable economic environment in Korea, 
they continued to back the repressive regime and maintained business contracts with 
conglomerates in Korea. Their interest in investment and trade in South Korea was promoted by 
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U.S. government officials’ pressure to Korea. There were several moments in which American 
business interest flexed their power alongside the Park administration.  
In the late 1970s, the anti-nuclear-power movement in the U.S. had pushed the U.S. 
government to rescind new orders for domestic plants, and South Korea became a convenient 
solution to the problem of Westinghouse’s surplus production capacity.149 Westinghouse and the 
nuclear industry stood to gain tens of billions of dollars in contracts for nuclear power plants 7 
and 8 alone. Park was first indecisive about the proposal because he knew that building 
laboratories for science institutes and a major highway that connected Seoul and major Southern 
cities were higher policy priorities than building nuclear power plants. However, when President 
Moore of the U.S. Export-Import (Ex-Im) Bank visited Park on behalf of Westinghouse to lobby 
for the nuclear plants, Park had to reluctantly accept the offer, since Korea was Ex-Im bank’s 
biggest borrower.150  
In the same period, California and Gulf Coast agribusiness harvested a surplus of medium 
grain rice. Korea, faced with a terrible harvest in 1980 during the Chun administration, sought to 
make up the deficit by importing from California agribusiness. However, just before the sale of 
644,000 tons went through, California farmers raised the price by $100/ton, profiting an extra 
$64 million.151 Also, when Korea needed a million more tons of rice, the farmers raised even 
more than $100/ton above the record price of that time. Korea accepted the following unfair 
deals due to the heavy lobbying by the Rice Millers Association to the Korean Embassy. 
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 When American businessmen showed concerns towards Korea’s lack of stability in the 
markets, Park and Chun frequently invited American business leaders to the Blue House and 
assured them that they would open up the market for investment purposes. Namely, to help allay 
investor fears, Chun invited leaders of the American Chamber of Commerce in Korea, including 
the president of 3-M and representatives of Bank of America, Dow Chemical, and Gulf Oil.152 
 American corporations supported the Park regime despite accusations of human rights 
abuses coming out of the Carter administration. As long as they were able to invest in Korea 
under stable and secure environment, corporations found ways to maintain business-friendly 
relationship with Seoul. American corporations also had close relationships with Korean veto-
players, especially business conglomerates and elites of the society, to push for business 
contracts that deemed profitable to their ends. The veto-players resisted accountability, and 
everyday business was carried out, overruling any concerns of the government’s heinous past.    
 
American Domestic Politics / Public Opinion 
During the period between 1979 and 1980, Korea was directly affected by American 
domestic politics. There were two critical events that facilitated the shift from protecting human 
rights to pursuing U.S. national security interests in Korea. The Iranian revolution in 1979 and 
the Soviet Union’s Afghanistan invasion that same year had a direct impact on U.S. policy 
towards South Korea.153 Sacrificing security in order to promote democracy and human rights – 
what had been the focus of President Carter’s foreign policy— became widely unpopular in 
America, which at the time was facing a humiliating hostage crisis and a renewed battle in the 
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Cold War.154 This diverted attention of both the State Department and the Carter administration, 
which shied away from the events in South Korea. William Gleysteen, U.S. ambassador to South 
Korea, noting that “Iran distracted the administration while it disciplined them,” utilized this 
public criticism to exert more pressure on the State Department and the Carter administration to 
respond to the Korean situation with caution. 155  The Carter administration maintained its 
“security first” policy throughout 1979 and 1980 in Korea. The U.S. realized that the military 
was the critical player in this transitional period, and paid close attention to its movements. 
While Robert Rich, director of Korean Affairs in the department at that time, alleged that “the 
Iran analogy existed at the White House and congressional level,”156 Ambassador Gleysteen also 
noted that heavy U.S. involvement in the Korean government may have produced anti-American 
outbursts in Korea like those in Iran.157 Others such as Secretary of State Cyrus Vance joined in 
to use the Iran example to warn against pressing too hard on the Korean government. Also, 
Carter was running for re-election against the hawkish Republican candidate Ronald Reagan. At 
the center of the presidential election was American security issue dealing with Iran, and Carter 
tried to calm the public and American voters by changing to more adamant military action. Thus, 
America’s public criticism of Korea by analogy as potentially “another Iran” and Carter’s effort 
to secure re-election may help to explain why the human rights-conscious Carter administration 
in 1979 changed its policy of asserting overt pressure on the Korean government for 
liberalizations. 
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Hanahoe was a secret military society that General Chun Doo-Hwan and General Roh 
Tae-Woo, along with graduates of the eleventh class of the Korean Military Academy, created in 
1955. 158  Chun and Roh specifically recruited officers who originated from the same home 
province, Kyong Sang province, as themselves. Its purpose was to build up a special coalition to 
help each other in the military hierarchy and political sphere. In particular, this military society 
was loyal to President Park, and he endorsed the society in return. Park appointed members of 
Hanahoe to military posts to help repress members of opposition parties. Hanahoe was 
considered the club of hard-liners in the military and closely contributed in Chun’s rise as the 
leader.159 It was a veto-player that maintained its strong grip on the Korean society through 
political and forceful force, quelling any movement that would threaten its privileged position 
and helping Chun’s rise to the power.  
On the night of December 12, 1979, Chun, along with others members of Hanahoe, 
launched a rapid and violent operation to arrest the Army’s pro-democracy chief of staff, General 
Chung Seung-Hwa.160 General Chung had initially vowed to keep the military out of politics and 
support the Choi administration for democratic transition. But because of this coup within the 
armed forces, Chun was able to seize control of the Korean military. The arrest of General 
Chung was possible because Hanahoe members maintained crucial posts as military leadership 
all throughout Seoul. They disrupted military communication and ignored orders from the top-
hierarchy, while making sure that General Chung was captured. Soon, Chun became the chief of 
the KCIA, an action rendered illegal by Chun’s refusal to resign from the military. With the 
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position that allowed Chun more threatening power, he hired Hanahoe members as KCIA agents 
and pressured the civilian government to declare martial law. Protests culminated on May 15, 
1980, when 70,000 to 100,000 students demonstrated in the heart of Seoul. Yet, on May 18, 
Chun suspended all political activity, closed the universities and arrested prominent rivals such 
as Kim Dae-Jung. Martial law brought an end to the protests. In the months after the uprising, 
Chun, with the help of Hanahoe members, went through the motions of amending the 
constitution and reorganizing his election as president by an electoral college of regime loyalists.  
Thus, Hanahoe was a major veto-player that kept Korea on the impunity path. It was the 
backbone of Chun’s ambitious plan to emerge as the leader of a non-democratic Korea. They 
capitalized on the kinship of Kyong Sang province and convinced heads of military powers to 
follow Chun’s rule. Opposition parties were forcefully aborted by Hanahoe members. As they 
controlled both the military and politics, the history of human rights abuse and repressive 
military action by the Park administration was again, continued through this specific veto-player, 
without any room to put a check on their power. 
 
Impunity During (and for) the Park Regime 
The impunity path that was created during the Rhee administration had allowed a military 
coup that overthrew Rhee’s presidency. The path was continued and protected by veto-players, 
and when Park himself was assassinated, the window of opportunity for democratization with 
justice was closed off too quickly because of veto-players, both internal and external ones, who 
had remained powerful. 
 Park’s regime was marked by his oppression towards his own citizens. It led to a myriad 
of injustices, such as torture, fabricated espionage charges, and suspicious deaths. Park 
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frequently proclaimed a state of emergency and suppressed democratic movements with an iron 
fist. Moreover, he created a legally and physically powerful intelligence entity, the Korean 
National Intelligence Agency (KCIA), to closely monitor anti-governmental activists. 161 The 
KCIA committed countless human rights violations with the power that it acquired from the 
executive. The agency arbitrarily detained individuals while in some cases, permitted summary 
executions.162  
Impunity was already well entrenched in the Park regime in many ways. By this time, 
many Japanese collaborators had consolidated their positions in both private and public sectors. 
Fifteen years had passed since the end of World War II and it made it that much more difficult to 
bring up the issue of their punishment now that Park, a former Japanese military officer and an 
anti-communist conservative, had taken over control. On the international side, even the U.S. 
found it difficult to deal with the Park administration. When Jimmy Carter became president in 
the mid-1970s, he put the issue of human rights abuses by President Park near the top of the U.S. 
foreign policy agenda.163 After Park’s proclamation of emergency decrees to crack down on 
rising opposition, the Carter administration and the Congress argued for cuts in military aid for 
South Korea to pressure the Park administration to be more responsive to U.S. concerns on 
human rights. Carter also announced plans for U.S. ground troop withdrawal in 1977. Yet, Park 
denied the existence of any human rights problems in South Korea.164 Alleging that Carter had 
failed to understand South Korea’s unique circumstance of national division and military 
confrontation against North Korea, Park’s advisors criticized Carter’s policy of military 
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withdrawal as an ill-informed policy that would hurt U.S. interests in stabilizing the Korean 
peninsula. At a state reception, Park remarked, “the protection and the survival of the thirty-six 
million [South] Korean people [constitutes] the highest [possible] form of [protecting] freedom, 
human rights, and democracy.”165 The Carter administration, to the contrary, argued that human 
rights abuses were “neither necessary nor justifiable even in South Korea’s difficult military 
situation.”166 
Responding to the Carter administration’s punitive measures, Park released fourteen 
leading dissidents from prison on July 17, 1977.167 However, Carter’s human rights policy was 
an impractical and politically unpopular policy that neither satisfied the human rights activists 
nor brought an end to human rights violations under Park’s regime. According to Kim, while 
Carter even created a bureau specially dedicated for human rights issues in the State Department, 
officials from the department and Carter’s key advisors still viewed human rights as secondary to 
“military, economic, and strategic considerations.” 168 Meanwhile, Carter’s withdrawal policy 
was met by opposition from the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and senior 
officials of the State Department. The security interests won major support and the commitment 
to the existing alliance was renewed in late 1979, as the Carter administration called for a new 
cold war to contain communist threats after the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan. By his 
last year as president, Carter brought down “his zeal for human rights issues.”169 Instead, he 
focused on the strategic value of the U.S.-South Korean alliance. With the security issues 
affirming the existential cold war threat looming the Korean peninsula, human rights violations 
and Park’s Yushin system fully operated as necessities for national defense.  
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The Rise and Decline of the “Seoul Spring” 
The transition between the assassination of Park in October 1979 and Chun’s rise to 
power in May 1980 was arguably not enough time in which to uncover the accumulated past 
wrongdoings by the state. But one puzzle remains: even though the prospects for a transition 
were very promising, even the basics of a democratic transition failed to occur in that 5 month 
period. Two factors seem to account best for the failed transition of 1979 - 1980.  
The first factor is that the interim government under Choi Kyu-Ha had failed to liberalize 
the dictatorial legacy and directly deal with wrongdoings of the Park administration. Choi’s lack 
of “political experience and leadership qualities” was evident when he became the acting 
president. 170  Choi angered opposition leaders when he announced a plan for an interim 
government before consulting them. 171  Choi had indicated a preference for democracy. He 
promised to reform the Yushin constitution that was written by the Park regime that guaranteed 
Park’s permanent presidency by indirect presidential election. He relaxed the political 
atmosphere by abolishing Emergency Decree No. 9, which was used to repress dissent during the 
Park regime, and releasing political prisoners and opposition politicians, including Kim Dae-
Jung. Although President Choi had promised to revise the constitution by the end of 1980 and to 
call a free and fair election172 that would be held in a timely manner, both the opposition and the 
government expressed fears that Choi’s refusal to announce a concrete timetable for 
constitutional reform and new elections was increasing the possibility of North Korean 
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intervention. 173  Ambassador Gleysteen was pessimistic about Choi’s ability to run the 
government, and he began to focus on other men, such as Prime Minister Shin.174  
President Choi had also failed to infuse his transition with transitional justice. Using this 
option may have reinforced Choi as a charismatic leader with control over the military and 
domestic politics, perhaps leading the country to a timely democratic transition. Since the 
country was experiencing a devastating and uncertain time after President Park’s assassination, it 
was much more necessary to set the order that no one is above the law and individuals and 
entities will be prosecuted for their crimes against the humanity. The country needed a check on 
its decades-old human rights violations and its veto-players’ consolidation of power. However, 
President Choi spent most of his career as a bureaucrat and failed to have an autonomous base in 
the regime. He could not maneuver the government like Park Chung-Hee, who managed all the 
decisions by himself through his power base. As a result, Choi made decisions consulting with 
former and incumbent bureaucrats.175 He did not have a solid independent power base within the 
military either.  With the December military takeover by General Chun, the U.S., seeking 
stability and order on the peninsula, favored Chun over the Choi administration. Choi, failing to 
move efficiently and effectively, ended up the victim of a military coup. Another opportunity to 
face the past and focus on nation-building was once again thwarted by the veto-players and the 
lack of leadership by the administration.  
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The second factor is that the U.S. shied away from an active effort to ensure the 
transition’s success. This transition period brought special challenge to the U.S. in deciding how 
to favor liberalization both gently and effectively without meddling too much in the domestic 
affairs of South Korea. Ambassador Gleysteen was clearly aware of the fact that the public in 
South Korea could have had a strong anti-American reaction if the U.S. did not support a 
democratic transition. However, according to Fowler, he seemed to fear an anti-American 
reaction within the Korean military even more. In the telegram from Gleysteen to Secretary 
Vance, he argued against pushing “too hard and too crassly” for liberalization. 176  Initially, 
General John Wickham, commander of U.S. Forces Korea, and Gleysteen considered supporting 
a counter-coup within the military by anti-Chun generals, but decided against it.177 Gleysteen, 
noting that the “United States should resist oversimplifying Korean politics by making Chun 
Doo-Hwan the sinister source of all evil,” decided to defend Chun.178  
As a result, when Chun imposed nation-wide martial law in May 1980 and led to 
thousands of casualties all throughout the country, the U.S. hesitated to question his authority. 
Meanwhile, the U.S. Forces approved Chun’s use of Combined Forces Command, joint military 
personnel stationed along the North-South border, to quell the uprisings. The National Security 
Council meeting on May 22, 1980 decided that the American approach to the Korean 
government to be “short term support, in the longer term pressure for political evolution.”179 A 
memo from the national security adviser lays out the justification for this approach: 
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1. Maintain security on the Korean peninsula and strategic stability in Northeast Asia. 
(Do not contribute to “another Iran”— a big Congressional concern.) 
2. Express a carefully calibrated degree of disapproval, public and private, towards 
recent events in Korea. (But not in a way which would contribute to instability by 
suggesting we are encouraging opposition to the Government.)180 
 
Accordingly, the Carter administration supported the suppression of the democratization 
movement in South Korea, even the infamous Gwangju uprising. On May 31, 1980, Carter told a 
CNN interviewer that “security interests must sometimes override human rights concerns.”181 
Thus, the Carter administration failed to use an important human rights right tool in the interest 
of security, and its hesitating silence helped cost South Korea an opportunity for democratic 
transition, as well as innocent lives.  
The negotiated transition model is the most conventional model that is applied to Korea 
for the period between 1979 and 1980. There were five actors during this period: hardliners and 
reformers in the ruling bloc, moderates and radicals in the opposition bloc, and the U.S.182 
According to the negotiated transition model, if the hardliners are more powerful than the 
reformers, the transition will be aborted. Likewise, if the moderates in the opposition bloc can’t 
maintain control over the radicals, the negotiation for democratization becomes impossible. The 
Korean case showed such conditions. The hardline military rose to power and controlled the 
reformers. The moderate New Democratic Party failed to be an opposition bloc due to its internal 
division on choosing a leadership and its failure to support the social movements. 
However, had Choi pressured actively for the U.S. intervention to ally with both 
reformers and moderates and forcefully win over the hardliners and the radicals, the outcome 
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might have turned out differently. While fulfilling the public’s call for rapid democratic 
transition may have been difficult, at least there was an opportunity for procedural democracy if 
the U.S. backed the reformers and the moderates. As Fowler argues, the fact that Choi did not 
ally with hardliners indicates that “he must have desired a transition and believed it was 
possible.”183 After Park’s assassination, Choi had three options to move forward: ally with the 
moderate opposition and seek a negotiated transition to democracy, ally with hardliners and 
support renewed authoritarianism, or make no commitments.184 Choi ended up with the last 
choice and with it, opened the way for a coup that kept Korea on its impunity path. 
 
Conclusion 
As in the moment after decolonization in the 1940s-50s, the opening to democracy during 
the brief “Seoul Spring” of 1979-80 was avoided by the lack of effective plan for democratic 
transition and by institutionalized activities of several new veto-players, this time American 
corporations, American domestic politics, and Hanahoe. The military, similar to that of the 
earlier case study, transformed and built up itself as a legitimate power in Korean politics and 
society. The failure to keep a check on veto-players located Korea onto an impunity pathway in 
which impunity was institutionalized and veto-players consolidated their power, making 
democratization much more difficult. 
  In this chapter I have argued that the period between Park’s assassination and General 
Chun’s military takeover could have been utilized as an opportunity to move on from the 
dictatorial legacy and bring historical justice, but it was thwarted by the existing hardliner forces 
within and outside the Korean society, notably American corporations and U.S. domestic politics.   
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America’s interest in its own security and stabilization in the Korean peninsula allowed room for 
General Chun to rise in power, and eight more years of dictatorship and repression.  
At the same time, while some may view this particular moment as a failed democratic 
transition, the pro-democratization movement that was developing in Korean civil society during 
this time paved way for the massive national democratization rallies during the Chun years. 185 
Students, workers, and political dissidents, while they could not realize what they had hoped for, 
built networks and planned for effective democratization process in the late 80’s. While the 
democratic transition in 1987 was a success, it was clearly delayed because of the power of veto-
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CHAPTER 4: JUSTICE DELAYED IS DEMORACY DELAYED: EVALUATING 
DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION IN KOREA, 1987-PRESENT 
 
Introduction 
This chapter will discuss the regimes that came after Chun’s dictatorship (1980-87) and 
how democratic transition came about with the help of a nationwide democratic movement. After, 
it will delve into truth and reconciliation process that started during the Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration (2003-2008) and to the current Park Geun-Hye administration (2013-present). 
The definition of consolidation of democracy will be applied to South Korea and measure the 
quality of the nation’s democratic culture. Evidently, South Korea’s advance in democracy is 
deceptive and its democracy needs further development to be fully consolidated.  
Completing the path dependency analysis, I will show how choices that were made 
during both critical junctures— the period between the mid-1940’s and early 1950’s and the 
window of time from October 1979 to May 1980— led Korea to remain on the impunity path 
after 1980. I will also discuss how the impunity path explains why Korea had a pacted transition 
without historical justice, and why the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Korea was 
limited, due to still existing veto-players. It is evident that human rights abuses committed by 
veto-players were often protected and continued without any check. Impunity was continued and 
historical injustice was partially resolved, and this has darkened the road to Korea’s 
consolidation of democracy. Justice delayed is democracy delayed in the case of South Korea’s 

















































June 10 Democratization Movement occurred 
 
Democratic transition began with the June 29 Declaration 
 
Roh Tae-Woo elected President 
 
National Assembly held fact-finding hearings on the Gwangju Uprising  
 
Special Law compensated victims of the Gwangju Democratic Movement  
 
Kim Young-Sam elected President 
 
Seoul District Court issued Chun a death sentence and Roh a 22 ½ year 
imprisonment 
 
President Kim Young-Sam pardoned both Chun and Roh 
 
Kim Dae-Jung elected President  
 
Special Law established to restore the reputation and compensate those 
involved in democratic movements, restore the reputation of victims  
of the Jeju April 3 Incident 
 
Roh Moo-Hyun elected President  
 
Special Acts to investigate forced mobilization and pro-Japanese collaboration 
under Japanese rule enacted 
 
Framework Act on Truth and Reconciliation established  
 
Special Law to investigate suspicious deaths in the military 
 
Truth & Reconciliation Commission, Republic of Korea established  
 
The Special Act to Redeem Pro-Japanese Collaborators' Property promulgated 
and entered into effect  
 
Lee Myung-Bak elected President 
 
Park Geun-Hye elected President 
Source: Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Korea, Truth and Reconciliation: Activities of the Past Three 




Post-Chun Regime and the Critical Juncture of 1987: Towards Transition 
After the May 1980 Gwangju uprising, military forces, who took up posts in both the 
National Assembly and the administration, elected their coup leader, General Chun Doo-Hwan, 
as president of South Korea under the indirect presidential election in which members of the 
National Assembly voted for the presidential candidate. Political repression and killings of 
political opposition silenced political dissidents. South Koreans had to wait another seven years 
to enjoy political freedom and liberty from dictatorship.  
Under the Chun regime from 1980 to 1987, more than a thousand people were falsely 
accused of being North Korean spies. 186 They were indefinitely imprisoned and tortured for 
violating the National Security Law and the Emergency Law.187 The National Security Law was 
used as a grand umbrella security law that prohibited any actions of plotting treason and posing 
danger to the country. The KCIA used this particular law as their leverage to arrest and imprison 
anyone they sought after.   
From the beginning, the Chun regime lacked legitimacy and trust from its own citizens, 
and it slowly sought ways to boost its popular appeal. By the end of 1983, the regime 
implemented an “appeasement policy” to decrease oppression to a considerable extent.188 Under 
the new policy, students were able to re-enter school, and sanctioned professors returned to 
universities. They also needed to maintain peace and order in order to successfully hold the 1986 
Seoul Asian Games and the 1988 Seoul Summer Olympics. The policy opened doors to a 
growing pro-democracy movement. Students started a campaign to promote democratization that 
led to direct struggle against the Chun’s regime. Then, the labor movement, along with 
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movements of the urban poor and peasantry, joined in to the campaign. The student-labor 
solidarity was consolidated as students left colleges and engaged in factory work disguised as 
workers in order to participate in the labor movement themselves or to support workers.189 The 
political dissident movement resumed. They formed the Council for the People’s Democratic 
Movement in June and the National Council for Democratic Reunification in October.190  
The year of 1984 was the watershed moment in which the democratization movement 
developed drastically in all parts of civil society. Gu and Ki argue that the most significant factor 
that accounts for the explosive growth of the democratization movement in the 1984 and 1985 
was the “shock of the savage suppression by military forces in Gwangju.”191 The army, whose 
duty was to protect the lives of its citizens, dispatched elite airborne troops to massacre citizens 
of Gwangju. This experience had enraged and shocked pro-democracy forces. Many felt guilty 
for not lending a hand to innocent people in Gwangju, while the media labeled their resistance as 
a communist uprising.  
The 1980s pro-democracy activism was distinct and significant in that it was no longer 
limited to the student movement and the dissident movement. It was now aligned with social 
movements, especially with the labor sector. With Chun’s appeasement policy, the opposition 
parties— the New Korean Democratic Party and the Korea National Party— that were excluded 
from the political scene, reentered the political arena through the February 12th general election 
in 1985 and expressed opposition to dictatorship and supported democratization move clearly. 
With the democratization movement growing in every sector of the Korean society, it was then 
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possible to form the largest democratic coalition. 192  The democratization forces proposed a 
constitutional amendment for direct election of the president as their immediate goal. The Chun 
regime repressed dissidents who argued for the constitutional amendment. Its extreme repression 
against the movement resulted in serious violation of human rights. It tortured a prominent 
dissident leader named Kim Geun-Tae, and, most significantly, tortured and killed Park Jong-
Cheol, a college student. 193 Park’s death stirred a massive popular uprising, and nationwide 
ceremonies mourning his death occurred throughout Korea.  
The democratization coalition decided to hold a massive national rally on June 10, 1987 
to protest Park’s death and to demand an amendment for a democratic constitution.194 This has 
turned out to be the beginning of the June Democratic Uprising, which was the national protest 
movement that forced the regime to accept the popular demand for democratization. The uprising 
lasted for about 20 days until the June 29th, when millions of citizens came out to the streets 
despite police repression.195 The Chun regime finally announced a plan to resolve the situation. 
The plan, also known as the June 29 Declaration, consisted of eight items— mainly, a 
constitutional amendment for direct election of the president.196 It finally opened the way to 
democratic transition that would democratize the authoritarian regime in South Korea.   
After the June Declaration, workers stirred up the nation by fighting for labor rights from 
early July to September. Workers demanded their basic rights that had not been guaranteed under 
Korea’s authoritarian regimes, such as wage increases, the improvement of working conditions, 
the right to union representation and the right to collective agreements. There were five actors 
during this process: hardliners (Chun Doo-Hwan) and reformers (Roh Tae-Woo) within the 
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regime who recognized the need to negotiate, moderates and radicals in the opposition bloc, and 
civil society’s pro-democracy organization, National Coalition for Constitutional Reform, that 
worked with the opposition bloc.  
  Alongside workers’ protest, politicians started the process of democratic transition 
according to the June 29 Declaration. All political parties assumed the task of amending the 
Constitution. The Democratic Justice Party, the majority party, and the Reunification Democratic 
Party, the main opposition party, had a political negotiation of eight leaders and drafted a 
constitutional amendment based on direct election of the President with a single five-year term. 
The bill was passed by the National Assembly, and the new Constitution was adopted on October 
29, 1987, and presidential election campaigns began. However, voters became divided by the 
fact that the two leading candidates of the opposition would not cooperate in the selection of a 
single opposition presidential candidate. Votes were split between two opposition leaders, Kim 
Dae-Jung and Kim Young-Sam, against Roh Tae-Woo, President Chun’s protégé. In the end, the 
democratization forces lost the presidential election held on December 17. Roh Tae-Woo of the 
Democratic Justice Party won 36.6%, candidate Kim Young-Sam of the Reunification Party won 
28.1%, and candidate Kim Dae-Jung of the Party for Peace and Democracy won 27.0%.197 
The democratization movement brought about a democratic transition in South Korea 
through the June Democratic Uprising, but it provided an opportunity for remnants of the past 
dictatorial regimes to come back to power legitimately. By 1987, actors of the pro-democracy 
coalition were able to win a pacted transition, but they weren’t able to win a transition with 
justice, once again. Pro-impunity veto-players, despite the public’s call for democratization and 
accounting of past wrong, still took firm hold of their place in the society and resisted 
accountability of their history.  
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South Korea’s Democratic Transition, 1987-92: Transition without Justice 
President Roh Tae-Woo’s June 29 Declaration began the process of democratic transition, 
especially the period between 1987 and 1992. The South Korean form of democratization was an 
example of “pacted democracy.”198  This is a democracy held together by an agreement among 
elite groups of the country to bring about democratic transition without confronting impunity 
through trials and investigations. 199  Both the reform group within the government and the 
moderate opposition group compromised because they saw that the collapse of the government 
would not meet their mutual interest. The reform group within the government, Roh Tae Woo 
and his core group that led New Democratic Party, made a concession to restore formal 
democracy, the moderate opposition group, Reunification Democratic Party, did not ask for the 
reform group’s immediate exit from power and it took advantage of the reform group’s weak 
incumbency.200 This was possible because there was a strong and organized base of civil society 
from numerous sectors such as students, workers, and priests that went against the Chun regime 
and worked alongside the opposition bloc. With the negotiated transition engineered within the 
political system, South Korea was able to sustain continuity in political, social, and economic 
structures.201  
As the first civilian president in 32 years, President Kim Young-Sam was elected in 1993 
and started his presidency with buoyancy from the nation’s high level of support. With strong 
public support and personal charisma, Kim pushed to restore legitimacy, and took some steps to 
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deepen democracy. 202  He tackled problems of corruption, the establishment of civilian 
supremacy over the military as part of a firm military reform program, the implementation of a 
vibrant market economy, and the amendment of political inspired laws.203 His reforms were 
designed to consolidate democracy by eliminating the old remains of authoritarian legacies. 
However, as O’Donnell argues, the democratic transition process is always uncertain and 
complex, and the possibilities for authoritarian regression are numerous.204 Kim’s administration 
did not fully consolidate South Korean democracy. According to Lee, his reforms merely posed 
directions toward a democratic society and failed to produce positive outcomes in the long-
term. 205  Even though they were driven by Kim’s strong will, they were not implemented 
consistently. His reforms did not have the support of his political circle or reform groups, and he 
was criticized for the undemocratic decision-making process that was characteristic of his 
staff.206 The failure of Kim’s government was apparent in the decline of his popularity and poor 
economic conditions at the end of his tenure.  
Kim’s focus was on building a moderate democratic system, in which he believed that 
democratic government could emerge through free and fair elections. The restoration of a 
democratic system was the essential goal after authoritarian rule. Yet, his understanding of 
democracy as a procedure was not enough to achieve the consolidation of democracy. 
Consolidation requires having members of the society playing on even field, especially 
confronting impunity of the society. Yet, under Kim, democratic consolidation was limited, as 
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evidenced by the fact that the only non-judicial truth commissions, not trials, were possible 
during that time. 
 
Almost but Not Quite: Trials and Truth Commissions of the 1990s 
During President Kim Young-Sam’s term, there were new calls for prosecuting the 
military leaders who had been instrumental in maintaining power and suppressing dissent during 
the Chun regime.207 Allegations of internal corruption and graft against Presidents Chun Doo-
Hwan and Roh Tae-Woo were disclosed, and led to their 1997 trial and conviction, along with 
six other military leaders.208 The charges ranged from military insubordination, subversion of the 
constitutional order, and corruption. Seoul District Court issued Chun a death sentence and a fine 
of $132 million, and Roh was sentenced a 22 ½ year imprisonment and a fine of $158 million.209 
Several months after the conviction, however, the appellate court commuted Chun’s sentence to 
life imprisonment and Roh’s sentence to seventeen years in prison. Then, in December 1997, 
President Kim Young-Sam, following President-elect Kim Dae-Jung’s advice, pardoned Chun, 
Rho, and other accomplices in the interest of national harmony and reconciliation.210 With trials 
clearly not possible, since then, truth commissions that are separate from the criminal justice 
system  have been the instrument of choice for addressing the past.  
After Kim Dae-Jung’s election in 1997, public pressure for truth and commissions to 
investigate past misconduct strengthened. Several new instrumental commissions were 
established. The Commission for Restoring Honor and Compensation for Victims of 
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Democratization Movements was tasked with deciding whether applicants were involved with 
the democratization movement and to make recommendations regarding their treatment.211 It 
provided applicants with pardons for convictions and bestowed honorary diplomas.212 The Truth 
Commission on Suspicious Deaths was set up to investigate suspicious deaths that happened 
during the authoritarian era. It maintained nine commissioners appointed by the President, and it 
focused on deaths related to the democratization movement since August 7, 1969. The 
commission received 80 petitions alleging suspicious deaths, and it confirmed 19 of the cases in 
which they were a result of unlawful exercise of state power during the democratization 
movement.213 However, after much investigation and digging of the past, the prosecution of past 
wrongdoers never materialized. This was because the choices that were made at earlier critical 
junctures set Korea onto an impunity path. Powers of veto-players were protected and paths for 
resolving historical injustice were closed and as a result, democratization was delayed even after 
1987.  
 
South Korea’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
Finally, in 2003, President Roh Moo-Hyun, known for his work on behalf of human 
rights during the 1980s, fully embraced the truth and reconciliation process. With wide support 
from the National Assembly, he established more commissions and continued support for the 
already existing ones. According to Wolman, the new commissions from this period are divided 
into three categories: 1) the commissions that dealt with issues stemming from the Japanese 
annexation and earlier; 2) the commission that dealt with human rights violations from the post-
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1945 era of authoritarianism; 3) the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Korea, which was 
established as a larger and comprehensive commission that dealt with issues from both the 
Japanese colonial and authoritarian eras.214  
As a result of Roh’s commissions, however, the political sphere became polarized, and 
veto-players from the past were re-activated. Veto-players’ powers were once again protected 
and resisted accountability of their past. Many conservatives had direct or indirect connections to 
the authoritarian era and to collaborators from the Japanese colonial era. The Commission of 
Confiscation of Properties of Pro-Japanese Collaborators was established in December 2005 to 
identify and confiscate real property that was gained through pro-Japanese activities during the 
colonial era. The commission had seized 23.7 million dollars’ worth of property from 168 
individuals who had either inherited the properties or purchased them.215 In terms of dealing with 
the authoritarian era, the Roh administration established a number of commissions within 
government agencies to reveal possible human rights abuses by the agencies during the 
authoritarian era. The Policy Committee investigated the police involvement in massacres, fraud 
elections, illegal surveillance and fabrication of evidence during the regimes.216 The Defense 
Ministry committee examined cases of forced conscription, military agent training, and a training 
camp for civilians.217 However, while property might have been confiscated and investigations 
delving into human rights abuses during the authoritarian era were carried out, not a single 
person was prosecuted under the rule of law. This lack of legal justice is a proof of how veto-
players were able to exercise their power and stand protected by their institutionalized impunity.  
                                                 
214 Ibid., p. 40, 41.  
215 "Investigation on Pro-Japanese Collaborators Closes." KBS Global, July 7, 2010. Accessed February 23, 2014. 
http://world.kbs.co.kr/english/news/news_Dm_detail.htm?No=73918. 
216 Wolman, op. cit: 43. 
217 Ibid., p. 45.   
Yang 90 
 
On July 31, 2005, in accordance to the Framework Act on Clearing up Past Incidents for 
Truth and Reconciliation, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Korea (TRCK) was 
established. The law was mainly drafted and introduced by National Assembly members of Roh 
Moo-Hyun’s Uri Party.218 Conservatives from the opposition Hannara Party had argued against 
the commission, claiming that it will lose its objectivity and reflect political grudges in its 
investigation. However, because of the Uri Party’s dominance in the Assembly at that time, 
members of Uri Party went ahead and passed the bill. The TRCK was created with a stated 
purpose to “foster national legitimacy and reconcile the past for the sake of national unity by 
honoring those who participated in the anti-Japanese movements and investigating incidents 
regarding human rights abuses, violence, and massacres occurring from the period of Japanese 
rule to the present time; specifically during the nation’s authoritarian regimes.”219  
The TRCK was an investigatory body that responded to petitions submitted by the 
general public. Investigations included site visits, archival research, and questioning of pertinent 
authorities. It maintained fifteen Commissioners, including four Standing Commissioners, who 
were appointed as public officers. 220  Commissioners served for a two-year term, with the 
possibility of reappointment for a second term. The President appointed eight, four were 
nominated by the President, and three were nominated by the Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court. 221  Most Commissioners have been lawyers, while a good number of others were 
historians, religious leaders, and civil rights leaders.  
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Despite these impressive-sounding structures, the Commission maintained relatively 
weak powers to enforce cooperation. It was able to subpoena documents and evidence to be 
turned over from state authorities, but they were often denied when officials claimed that the 
evidence carried sensitive national security details.222 By July 31, 2010, its investigations came 
to a close, and it issued its final report on December 31, 2010. It investigated 11,175 claims 
submitted by the public; of those, 8,468 claims were verified, 1,725 claims were dismissed, and 
510 claims were unverified.223 The TRCK put special focus on human rights abuse during the 
authoritarian regimes. It examined cases relating to illegal or unfair exercise of state power, 
serious infringements of human rights such as death, serious injury or disappearance and 
instances of unjust court verdicts often regarding violation of the National Security Law.224  
Although critics claimed that the commission found nothing new, it also shed light on 
how the U.S. forces committed human rights abuses during the Korean War.225 Fundamentally, 
the commission issued recommendations to both governmental officials and organizations. In 
cases involving past massacres, recommendations focused on providing state apologies, revising 
family registries, instituting memorial events, revising historical records, peace and human rights 
education, law revisions, and medical subsidies for the wounded.226 In human rights abuse cases, 
it recommended retrials, state apologies, deletion of records, and the provision of compensation 
and medical services for victims and bereaved families. 227  It also has recommended the 
                                                 
222 Dong-Choon, Kim. "The Long Road Toward Truth And Reconciliation." Critical Asian Studies 42, no. 4 (2010): 
546.  
223 Yong-Kick Kim, Remembering the Almost Forgotten Killings: The Civilian Victims in the Korean War. Report. 
Vol. 28. Seoul. Symposium on Transitional Justice and Beyond in Korea, 2010. 
224 Wolman op cit.: 47. 
225 Kobayashi Akira, "The Unknown Korean War: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Korea and 
Excavation of the Remains of Mass-Murdered Victims." Asia-Pacific Journal, February 2, 2010. Accessed March 
26, 2014. http://www.japanfocus.org/~kobyashi-Akir/3351. 
226 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Korea, Truth and Reconciliation: Activities of the Past Three Years 18, 




government to pass a law awarding compensation to victims. The commission offered 
recognition to victims of the past and apologies by the state agencies, and even President Roh 
officially apologized for the State’s role in the Ulsan Bodo League in the 1950s when the State 
violently suppressed suspicious leftists in Ulsan, resulting in the death toll of 100,000 to 
200,000.228  
When the conservative Lee Myung-Bak administration (2008-2013) gained control, 
however, his administration failed to continue the on-going efforts of rectifying the past and 
minimally, procedurally carried out investigations of human rights abuse. The Lee administration 
did not issue any official apologies.229 While he chose not to renew the mandates of the TRCK 
and did not issue an official English-language report by the end of its closure, he initiated a new 
commission to address forced emigration during Japanese rule.230  
 
Any Justice by the TRCK? 
In the theory chapter of the thesis, I argued that legal justice, using the rule of law with 
due process for both prosecution and defense, is the best form of justice. The TRCK, due to 
insufficient authority, lack of cooperation from other governmental organizations and lack of 
time, was not able to reveal the truth to the fullest and enforce strongly on its recommendations. 
It failed to impose adequate legal justice on those who benefitted from impunity and human 
rights abuse, and ultimately it failed to provide adequate legal justice to the Korean society. In 
the cases that the TRCK revealed and investigated, from the Japanese colonialism era to today’s 
human rights abuse, the commission was only able to provide governmental recommendations, 
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which were not enforced by the law. Namely, it gave recommendations to public authorities, 
such as the Ministry of National Defense or the National Intelligence Service, that they give 
formal apologies to victims and to the court for retrials.231  
Most notably, the generals and soldiers who were part of massacres and tragic killings 
were not brought to justice. In the case of Cheongwon Bodo League Massacre, when, in the 
wake of the Korean War, South Korean Police and the Counter Intelligence Corps massacred 
232 civilians who were suspected as leftists, the commission exhumed 332 remains, 235 bullets, 
and 300 other victim-related articles in Cheongwon County.232 However, the government only 
offered an official apology, provided peace and human rights education for soldiers, police, and 
civil servants who were involved with the killing, supported memorial services for the victims, 
and built permanent facilities to preserve the victims’ exhumed remains. This trend of 
“government apology” is carried out in almost all of the cases that the commission investigated, 
while no individual or entity is indicted on any charges. Accordingly, while the commission tried 
to reconcile the past by recognizing the victims, identifying the perpetrators and offering 
government apologies, it failed to fully set a precedent that anyone involved in past impunity will 
be brought to justice and human rights abuse will not be tolerated. Only by legal prosecution can 
victims be fully recognized and defendants face the consequences of their actions. As legal 
scholar Diane Orentlicher writes, “Prosecution is the most effective insurance against future 
repression.”233 Trials in the criminal justice system do more than non-judicial commissions to 
break down impunity. In the case of the TRCK, justice was minimally realized within procedural 
and symbolic channels but impunity remained virtually untouched.  
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The Impunity Path and the Consolidation of Democracy 
There is an ongoing controversy among scholars of comparative politics and 
democratization about what democratic consolidation entails. Generally, there is a divide 
between those favoring a minimalist definition234, which is backed by O’Donnell, Dahl, Stepan 
& Skach; and maximalist definition235 advanced by Gould, Chang, Dryzek, Kowert & Legro.236 
This thesis, while favoring a maximalist definition, focuses specifically on the political elements 
of a broader definition of the consolidation of democracy that emphasizes “guarantees of civil 
rights, democratic accountability, civilian control over the military, democratic and constitutional 
checks on executive authority, and punishment of occupational and human rights abuses.”237 At 
the same time, my definition also includes punishment of past human rights abuses in a context 
of truth and reconciliation within the process of democratic consolidation.  
I would also argue further that adherence to human rights and legal justice promotes 
democratic quality.238 By rectifying abuses of the past, it establishes a culture of accountability 
and respect for human rights, which are also core democratic values.239 In order for a transitional 
country to be democratically consolidated, its historical injustice must be amended and resolved.  
The table below explains ways in which it reinforces democratic consolidation.240  
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Briefly, political tolerance supports extension of the rights of political competition. 
Prevention of intergroup prejudice suspends group stereotypes and promotes intergroup trust and 
cooperation. The support for human rights culture allows legitimacy for governmental officials 
to use the rule of law with authority and make binding decisions. Lastly, by building and 
certifying a collective memory of the past, truth and reconciliation can free the society from 
obsession of past injustice and redirect political debate to contemporary issues. 
In the case of Korea, while there is general acceptance that it has achieved a successful 
democratic transition, scholars are skeptical about Korea’s consolidation of democracy. 241 
Indeed, I will now identify four variables to investigate how Korea has not reached the stage of 
consolidated democracy: individual rights and freedom of expression, checks and balance on the 
executive power, transparency and accountability in its political institutions, and promoting truth 
and reconciliation in the Korean society at large. 
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The first area that is problematic is the lack of individual rights and freedom of 
expression. By early 2000, the oversight of the National Intelligence Service, which was a major 
state apparatus of surveillance and investigation of opposition parties during the authoritarian 
regimes, was reduced and kept out of domestic politics.242 Yet, there is still concern expressed by 
the Amnesty International reports that Korea maintains the National Security Law that allows 
arbitrary restriction of political rights such as freedom of expression and association. 243 
Provisions of the National Security Law have been used to restrict the propagation of ideas that 
authorities consider Communist or pro-North Korean. Given its situation vis-à-vis the North, 
these restrictions are not surprising; however, they may hinder the ways in which citizens 
practice their constitutional rights. In recent years, several journalists have been prosecuted under 
criminal libel laws for critical or aggressive reporting. 244 Two of the three major television 
networks, KBS and MBC, are owned by the government, which appoints presidents to these 
networks. The neutrality and independence of the media is still controversial.245  
Another area is the difficulty in checks and balance on executive power. It is evident in 
the recurring scandals involving big business groups and elected high-ranking officials. Korean 
presidents under the authoritarian and democratic regimes were imprisoned and indicted on 
charges of accepting bribes and kickbacks from large conglomerates in sums up to as high as U.S. 
$900 million.246 In May of 2009, President Roh Moo-Hyun, the human rights champion who 
greatly expanded the role of the TRCK, was not immune from the widespread corruption 
scandals, and committed suicide. He had acknowledged that a businessman who supported him 
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had given more than $6 million to his wife and son and his brother’s son-in-law while he was in 
office.247 Roh, who publicly berated the powers of Chun Doo-Hwan and Roh Tae-Woo in the 
80’s and the 90’s, followed the footsteps of his predecessors— every former South Korean 
president since the 1980s has faced corruption accusations or gone to prison on such charges 
after his term was over.248 Also, President Kim Dae-Jung was embroiled in a scandal when he 
transferred $100 million through a government-supplied loan to North Korea before his 
landmark summit meeting in North Korea.249 The widespread corruption is linked to the culture 
of breaking rules and ignoring the legal procedures among presidents. This impunity has located 
Korea onto a pathway where veto-players resisted accountability and consolidated their power. 
Shin and Chu argue that “in Korea, under the emperor-like presidential system,” the decision 
making procedure for governmental policy has been ignored frequently in the past.250 Just as the 
Kim Dae-Jung administration illegally funneled a large sum of taxpayer money to North Korea, 
presidents have often resorted to illegal methods to achieve their policy goals, especially in the 
area of national security.  
Third area is the dearth of transparency and accountability in its political institutions. 
Korea has endeavored to promote the expansion of information about governing procedures to 
the public. Reforms such as passing of the laws of Civil Servants Ethics in 1993, the Information 
Disclosure Act in 1997, and the public confirmation hearings of high-ranking civil servants since 
2000 have improved democratic accountability in Korea.251 Nonetheless, Shin and Chu argue 
that as political scandals involving bribes and kickbacks reveal, the information provided to the 
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public is still limited and the process of policy-making still remains a murky area for citizens.252 
Hwang also adds that the legacy of the authoritarian regime leads to secret patterns within the 
policy-making process.253 Many high-ranking civil servants are appointed as a reward for their 
contribution to the political success of presidential elections, instead of the competitiveness of 
candidates.254 The lack of a roll-call voting system and the small number of standing committees 
exacerbate democratic accountability problems. 255 In 2003, the Korean EAB survey asked a 
group of questions to Korean citizens.256 When asked about the cover-up of illegal and corrupt 
practices, a majority (total 54%) replied that the government does so “always” (12%) or “very 
often” (42%). Another considerable portion (43%) said “sometimes” and a negligible minority 
(%4) said “rarely.” When asked about the openness of governmental agencies to the public, only 
about one-third of Koreans perceived the extent of openness as “a lot” (2%) or “somewhat” 
(30%). More than two-thirds, on the other hand, said that government agencies were not much 
open to the public (60%) or not open to it at all (8%). This number contributes to the general 
public sentiment in Korean society that elected officials seek to avoid accountability to the 
electorate.  
Lastly, the lack of truth and reconciliation process in the Korean society remains an 
obstacle to its democratic culture. As has been mentioned earlier, upon the establishment of the 
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TRCK, it received 10,860 petitioned cases and 9,154 (84.2%) were chosen for investigation.257 
Governmental recommendations were made to resolve past conflicts and create an environment 
for greater solidarity in the future. Accordingly, no trials were held. However, the commission’s 
non-judicial nature did not adequately promote justice in the Korean society. The lack of legal 
justice failed to put a check on veto-player’s power and undermined citizens’ trust in the 
government.  
The TRCK came to a close as its mandate expired in 2010. Dong-Choon Kim, one of the 
scholars that helped investigate cases of the TRCK, argued that “there are many more that we 
must study and research” even after the TRCK disbanded. 258  In an interview with Radio 
Netherlands Worldwide, he emphasized that the legacy of suffering lives on among the families 
of victims, adding “they still have some economic and psychological difficulties. Some 
communities were totally devastated.”259 He concluded that one of the reasons why the TRCK 
was not extended was because “the current conservative regime doesn’t want to make this kind 
of incident known to the Korean people and to other people.” The TRCK’s request for 
documents and evidence was hampered by the lack of cooperation by the National Intelligence 
Service and other governmental agencies. 260 There are still sites that must be exhumed and 
investigated, and massacre accounts that must be heard and told. Today, there are still untold 
truth and unresolved reconciliation that is deeply rooted in the Korean Society, and they will 
hinder the political institutions from moving forward in focusing on contemporary issues and the 
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future. Until this task is embraced by all political parties and completed, Korean society will be 
far from the level of consolidation of democracy.  
 
Today 
As Park Geun-Hye, the daughter of dictator Park Chung-Hee, currently holds the 
presidency, there has been a limited role in addressing past injustices. During her campaign, Park 
stressed the idea of unity and reconciliation between past adversaries and visited the graves of 
important democracy advocates.261 While Park has discussed forming a commission to deal with 
reconciliation issues, especially the ones that took place during her father’s dictatorship, she still 
has not announced any concrete plans for investigation or mandates for such a body. In recent 
times, her administration has focused more on addressing human rights abuses in North 
Korea.262  There may be the resurgence of old military-based veto-players, such as actors in the 
national security apparatus, as the conservative Park administration takes a hard line on the 
relationship with the North.  
As a result, various civil society organizations have taken the lead in seeking historical 
justice. The recently-formed Forum on Truth and Justice has attempted to take over the work of 
the TRCK. The organization has published lists of individuals who collaborated with the 
Japanese imperial regime. It recently issued its first list of 3,096 collaborators in 2005, which 
included Park Chung-Hee and other prominent political figures.263 Still, the division between the 
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conservatives and liberals will remain over the truth and reconciliation issues. 264 While the 
conservatives try to progress from the past and focus on human rights abuses by North Korea, 
the liberals will seek the past and address past injustices by setting up commissions. The TRCK 
has played a prominent role in initiating the process of addressing Korea’s past, and given that 
trials are, at this point, impossible, it must be renewed to serve as an institutional channeling in 
dealing with the after effects of a particularly turbulent twentieth century.  
 
Conclusion 
Even after Chun’s authoritarian regime came to an end in 1987 with the June Declaration, a 
landmark success that was the result of Korean civil society’s well-organized protest, the 
remnants of impunity and powers of veto-players were still deeply entrenched in Korean society. 
Efforts to rectify historical injustice through organized investigative entities such as the TRCK 
failed to bring legal justice to both defendants and victims of the past. Oftentimes, the effort to 
bring justice was attacked by the conservatives and veto-players who tried to resist 
accountability. This reflects the impunity path that Korea has taken on since independence and is 
still following to the present day. Justice was thwarted and democracy was delayed. Only trials 
in the justice system can eliminate remains of impunity and set a precedent that no one is above 
the law. As a result, the culture of impunity is still present in Korean society. That is why, 
despite the shortcomings of the model, the work of the TRCK, with the help of civil society 
organizations, must be resumed to deal with the past and to fully consolidate Korea’s road to 
democracy.  
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In this thesis, I have argued that South Korea’s democratic development has been 
hindered by veto-players’ institutionalization of impunity that prevented a truth and 
reconciliation process centered on prosecuting past regime crimes at certain moments of South 
Korean history. I supported this standpoint by carrying out two case studies on two “critical 
junctures” in Korean history— Chapter 2, the period265 between the mid-1940’s and early 1950’s 
and Chapter 3, the window of time266 from October 1979 to May 1980. In each of the eras, the 
institution of impunity became entrenched in Korean society and, over time, decayed democratic 
culture and delayed democratization. They were special moments that opened doors to rectify 
historical injustice and possibly, move forward with democratization. Nonetheless, the openings 
for new, democratic change were aborted by veto-players, and the institution of impunity located 
Korea onto a path where a dictatorial legacy still prevailed and veto-players consolidated their 
power. The path-dependent effects of remaining on the impunity path after 1980, along with how 
it set Korea up for a pacted transition without historical justice and how recent initiatives such as 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Korea have been limited due to the still-entrenched 
veto-players and their resistance to impunity, are further discussed in Chapter 4.  
This thesis also focused on ways in which the absence of legal justice as part of a truth 
and reconciliation process affects a nation’s consolidation of democracy. Often, it de-legitimates 
the current political regime and distracts the nation from focusing on contemporary and future 
issues of the nation. As shown in Chapter 4, under democracy citizens expect the government to 
be open and transparent, and thus the process of truth and reconciliation – even one without 
prosecutions – can help.  But prosecuting individuals, showing that nobody is above the law, is 
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the crucial way for political institutions to be held accountable and resolve past wrongdoings that 
come into attention time and again. Therefore, I have argued that a nation’s democracy cannot be 
fully consolidated unless its past problems and abuses are amended. Evidently, this is still the 
case in South Korea. There are still unresolved cases and hidden historical accounts of past 
injustice co-existing at the center of post-authoritarian Korean society. Yet, as seen in the case of 
the expiration of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Korea, the efforts to confront past 
problems have been thwarted and failed to be renewed by the recent administrations.  
On the other hand, South Korea’s developments in procedural democracy since the 
transition have been substantial: a democratic constitution, free and fair elections, multiple 
political parties, civil liberties, solid civilian control of the military, nonviolent horizontal power 
transfers between opposition parties, and increased checks and balance among state 
institutions.267 Moreover, South Korea elected Park Geun-Hye, the daughter of former dictator 
Park Chung-Hee, as its sixth democratic president. However, even in recent years, the country’s 
democratic procedures seem to be deceptive and reveal structural difficulties. During the Lee 
Myung-Bak administration (2008-2013), Lee carried out violent measures against 
antigovernment protesters and demonstrators; attempted to curtail and suppress freedom of 
expression and assembly in the name of uprooting politically motivated rumors; and made 
unilateral policies focused on infrastructure construction that bypassed the National Assembly.268 
In November 2013, high-ranking officers of the Defense Ministry, including chief of the 
National Intelligence Service, have been prosecuted and sentenced on charges of posting 
thousands of anti-North Korean political message on blogs and spreading 1.2 million Twitter 
                                                 
267 Sukhyun Kim, "Contentious Democracy in South Korea: An Active Civil Society and Ineffectual Political 
Parties," Taiwan Journal of Democracy 8.2 (2012): 52.  
268 Ibid., p. 54.  
Yang 104 
 
messages praising current President Park Geun-Hye ahead of the election.269 These officials 
praised government policies while attacking Ms. Park’s opposition as untrustworthy, pro-North 
Korean sympathizers. In the weeks following the indictment, Catholic, Protestant, Buddhist and 
other religious groups have issued statements demanding that Ms. Park resign on the grounds 
that she may have benefitted from illegal means to election, while Park dismissed the demands. 
 Though it is early in her term, this scandal resurfaces the notion that every former South 
Korean president since the 1980s has faced corruption accusations or gone to prison on charges 
after the term was over. Park’s predecessor, Lee Myung-Bak, who is from the same political 
party as Park, apologized publicly for scandals involving his brother Lee Sang-Deuk and Lee’s 
close aides receiving a series of bribes from Samsung. 270  Presidents before Lee’s 
administration— Roh Moo-Hyun, Kim Dae-Jung, Kim Young-Sam, Roh Tae-Woo— have all 
been indicted and accused of bribery scandals.271 In the end, Park Geun-Hye, with her party’s 
troubles, may not be immune from recurring tales of scandals. The recent corruption cases 
confirm that veto-players’ impunity, both undisclosed and made public, always resides in any 
given era and gets in the way of consolidating democracy.   
 Thus, the on-going nature of scandals and corruption in current Korean politics calls into 
question its prospects for democracy. The culture of injustice and impunity has taken over South 
Korea since its independence in the 1940’s and has limited the nation from making citizen-
centered choices and free and fair structural changes, and thus, it must be dealt with at all costs.  
One viable solution to mitigate this problem may be through activism and institutional checks by 
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Korea’s vibrant civil society. Starting from early 2000, Korea’s civil society has gained much 
support and traction by the Korean government. Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun built what is 
known as “participatory government” that increased financial backing for civic groups and 
encouraged direct civil society participation in the policy-making process.272 Also, more recently, 
the online “netizen” community has garnered considerable power as an informal force for 
political and social change.273  
In particular, the role of civil society to counter government corruption has expanded in 
terms of size and quality. In 1989, The Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ) was 
founded and helped establish the Real Name Financial Transactions System that requires all 
financial transactions to be conducted in real, legal names.274 This policy was initiated to forbid 
any third party members from protecting the confidentiality of illegal transactions in order to 
evade taxes.275 People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) was founded in 1994 
and developed a movement for business conglomerate (Chaebol) reform, political reform, and 
eradication of injustice and corruption.276 Notably in early 2000, citizen groups rallied together 
for “Anti-corruption movement with people’s participation” and inaugurated a highly-respected 
entity called Transparency International Korea.277 Likewise, civic groups have not only drafted 
various policies as alternatives to resolve corruption problems in the Korean society, but they 
have also acted as major players in enacting anti-corruption legislation, such as the Anti-
Corruption Act and the Money Laundering Prevention Act both in 2001. Civil society groups are 
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now requesting more measures to prevent corruption through a residents’ summons system, in 
which residents of a province may summon the head of the local government for a public hearing; 
enactment of Information Disclosure Act; reinforced protection for whistleblowers; a more 
transparent personnel system in the government; and the expanded scope of administrative 
disclosure.278   
Civil society has become a major force in Korea, and has been relatively successful at 
protecting itself from manipulation by the state.279 The clash between vibrant civil society as 
well as social movement and the culture of corruption within the state suggests that we may be 
approaching a contemporary “critical juncture” for South Korea. Just as Korean civil society and 
social movements played crucial roles in pressuring the authoritarian government to exit, to 
expedite the process of political transition, and to buttress a fragile democracy during the 
transition, it must continue to hold the government accountable to its citizens and ultimately, 
help consolidate its democracy.280 According to Kim, social movements in Korea are constantly 
evolving, and coalitions of different movement groups are becoming easier to form.281 They also 
coordinate and cooperate with political parties. Thus, further study on Korea’s democracy could 
be focused on the current state of social movement in Korea and how it could be used as a 
vehicle to bring about a judicial reform or political reconciliation to the Korean society. Also, 
investigating further on how the work of TRCK has been carried out by civic groups such as 
Truth and Justice Forum282 will also shed light on how the pursuit of truth and reconciliation is a 
continuing effort in Korean society, and significant role that civil society takes on in those efforts.   
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Division within Korean society between those who benefit from impunity and those 
whose rights are damaged by it must be bridged in order to fully consolidate its democracy. 
South Korea is at the threshold of democratic consolidation, yet there is still a disjuncture 
between the progressives and the conservatives, populist and political elites, and Honam and 
Yeongnam283. This state of disjuncture is a fragmented feature of today’s Korean politics. At the 
heart of this disjuncture is historical injustice— two opposing forces clashing against prosecution 
of pro-Japanese collaborators, ideological clash amongst political forces that ended in failure to 
hold authoritarian regimes accountable, and most importantly, veto-players’ institutionalization 
of impunity that set back the nation from moving forward with what people wished for: 
democracy. What Korea needs today is healing and reconciliation from the past, but most of all it 
needs the rule of law and an end to impunity. Only by confronting impunity, urging 
reconciliation between existing political institutions, and constructing a truly democratic identity, 
can Korea finally take off and achieve a legitimate, substantial, consolidated democracy that 
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